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THE RHETORIC OF JUDICIAL CRITIQUE: 
FROM JUDICIAL RESTRAINT TO THE VIRTUAL BILL OF 
RIGHTS 
Michael J. Gerhardt· 
Professor Michael Gerhardt traces the rhetoric employed by national leaders 
and commentators over the past century to describe popular conceptions of the 
judicial function. In particular, Professor Gerhardt examines the evolution of the 
terminology used in popular and political rhetoric, revealing their inconsistent 
application to political ideologies through time. Professor Gerhardt argues that 
such shifts in usage correspond with transfers of power between the political 
authorities controlling the central interests at stake in constitutional adjudication. 
Professor Gerhardt applies the shortcomings of traditional political rhetoric to the 
issues surrounding technological advancements, concluding that the proper 
treatment of technology by the Supreme Court in the twenty-first century will 
require recognition of the complex consequences posed by these advances. 
INTRODUCTION 
A look back on the importance of the Bill of Rights in American history 
provides a glimpse into its future. The circumstances at the tum of the century are 
illustrative: Recall that the overwhelming focus of political commentary was not 
on the new president's conception of the Bill of Rights or even his constitutional 
vision, but rather on the extent to which the bizarre path by which he had achieved 
office would undennine the legitimacy of his presidency. In their appraisals of the 
new president, Democrats and liberals spent much more time questioning his 
competence than his philosophy: They accused of him of being an intellectual 
lightweight who had been born with a silver spoon in his mouth, had a reckless past, 
• Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Constitutional Law, William & Mary Law School. 
B.A. Yale University, M.Sc. London School of Economics, J.D. University of Chicago. I 
am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky, Neal Devins, Dave Douglas, Marty Flaherty, Dave 
Garrow, Deborah Gerhardt, Bill Marshall, Alan Meese, and Paul Schwartz for helpful 
comments on portions of this Article; and to Paul Dame, William & Mary Law School Class 
of 2003, for his excellent research assistance. 
I completed this Article well before the terrorist attacks directed against the United 
States on September 11, 2001. Though national political leaders united not long thereafter 
to pass legislation expanding federal authority to combat terrorism, it is of course too soon 
to predict or fully assess the implications of the war on terrorism for the rhetoric of judicial 
critique. The key questions likely to divide (and perhaps define the differences among) 
people involve: ( 1) the proper balance between respecting civil liberties and protecting 
national security; (2) the relative scope of presidential and congressional authority to combat 
terrorism; and (3) the relative scopes of federal and state executive and legislative authorities 
to combat terrorism. To date, the primary locus for debate of these questions has been in 
political rather than judicial fora. 
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and had become a presence in national politics primarily because of his family's 
name, connections, and friends. Pundits worried that, because of his inexperience 
in national politics, the new president might be prone to be led by the strong right-
wing leaders of his party; many, including some of the president's most ardent 
supporters, wondered whether he truly was as conservative as he claimed to be. 
Democrats and liberals were especially critical of the Republican-dominated 
Supreme Court, which they considered, like the new president and the Republican-
led Congress, to be captive to corporate interests. They denounced the Court for its 
arrogance and for being filled with conservative activists bent on usurping 
congtessional authority. 
In this familiar picture, the Bill of Rights was far from center stage. Yet the 
familiarity should caution us, for the picture is not based on recent events. The 
circumstances I have described were the state of political affairs not in the year 
200 l, but rather 190 l. The president to whom I referred is not George W. Bush, but 
rather Theodore Roosevelt, who became the youngest person ever to become . 
president as a result of President William McKinley's assassination.' The Supreme 
Court to which I referred was led not by the staunch Republican William Rehnquist, 
but rather a Democrat, Melville Fuller, 2 who led a Court dominated by Republicans 
for over two decades during an era that took its name from one of the most 
controversial Supreme Court opinions of the times - Lochner v. New York.3 
If the political circumstances in 1901 and 200 I seem similar, it is partly because 
we continue to use much of the same rhetoric for critiquing judicial activity and 
ideology as commentators did over a century ago. It is particularly striking when 
one considers this usage persists in spite of the changes in agendas of national 
political leaders, including the Civil Rights Movement and the process of 
incorporation by which the Supreme Court made the vast majority of the Bill of 
Rights applicable to the states. The change in the Court's agenda has not coincided 
with or precipitated a change in terms of popular debate about the role of the 
Supreme Court in the American political, social, and legal order. The increasing 
prominence of the Bill of Rights in our legal order has not changed political 
rhetoric, but rather, been a function of the ideological drift that helps to explain how 
different conceptions become appropriated by very different political and 
intellectual movements over time. 
The purpose of this Article is to slcetch the evolution of the usage and meanings 
of our public rhetoric about the Supreme Court. The terms that constitute the bulk 
1 For the extraordinary path by which Theodore Roosevelt became McKinley's running 
mate in 1900 and his successor in 1901, see generally H.W. BRANDS, T.R.: THE LAST 
ROMANTIC 3-434 (1997). 
2 See JAMES w. ELY,JR., THECHIEFJUSTICESHIPOFMELVILLEW. FULLER, 1888-1910 
(1995). 
3 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
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of this rhetoric - "conservative," "liberal," 'Judicial activist," "judicial 
usurpation," and 'Judicial restraint" - have been fixtures in the lexicon of judicial 
critique throughout the past one hundred years. The usage of these terms has been 
constant, but the subjects to which they have referred have not. In this Article, I try 
to clarify these subjects, including the Bill of Rights. My focus is more on the 
meanings of these terms and concepts in popular and political rhetoric, of which 
they have been a constant part, and less on the precise intellectual or philosophical 
movements that these terms have signified or reflected over the past century. Thus, 
the focus is primarily on the public statements of national leaders (including 
justices) and commentators. My focus extends to the records of or commentary on 
judicial confirmation contests, which tend to provide the most highly visible 
circumstance in which political leaders express and attempt to shape popular 
conceptions of different judicial approaches to construction of the meaning of the 
Bill of Rights. The sketch I derive from these sources is primarily descriptive; I 
draw on primary and secondary materials to trace the path by which these terms 
have come to apply to different conceptions of the judicial function over time. This 
focus helps to illuminate the political objectives served by the usage of these terms, 
perhaps the most important of which has been to characterize judicial activity in 
politically salient images. 
Moreover, studying the evolution of our popular rhetoric helps to illuminate its 
limitations. In some important ways, it has impeded, rather than facilitated, greater 
public understanding of judicial activity. It obscures the fact that some notions cast 
as ideals, such as judicial restraint, do not belong and are not the province of any 
single perspective on constitutional·adjudication, but rather have belonged to or 
served different politically driven conceptions of the judicial function in different 
periods. 
The rhetoric of judicial critique is not likely to capture easily the complexity or 
full range of consequences of the great constitutional issue likely to dominate the 
next century. In the twentieth century, the dominant constitutional issue tended to 
be the relationship between the State and the national economy. Questions about 
the relationship between government and technology entered the national debate at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, because of economic and social disparities 
resulting from mass industrialization, and near the end of the century in debates 
over abortion rights. In the twenty-first century, the great constitutional issue is 
likely to be the relationship more generally between the government and 
technology. The latter issue is decidedly distinct from questions about the meaning 
or significance of federalism because advancements in technology are likely to 
obscure state and federal boundaries. Moreover, these advancements are likely to 
increase the gap between constitutional doctrine and political reality. I refer to 
these advancements as helping to shape a "Virtual Bill of Rights," by which I mean 
that the Supreme Court is invariably so far behind technological advancements that 
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it can never keep pace with them. This problem culminates in the likelihood that 
the Court's decisions, as a practical matter, will make little or no difference to the 
impact of these advancements on the various individual liberty interests implicated 
by them. Once the Court gets around to ruling on any of these technical questions, 
the technology on which it will have ruled already will have expired or morphed. 
The challenge is to enrich our political rhetoric about the Court to capture the 
complexity and significance of these circumstances. If we fail to meet this 
challenge, we can expect our language and thinking about the issues posed by 
technological progress to be stuck in the past. 
I. PROGRESSIVISM TO CONSERVATISM, 1900-1921 
It is tempting to treat the terms that are most commonly employed for 
describing political and judicial activity as if they had meant the same things in 
different historical periods. The great political historian Richard Hofstadter fell 
prey to this temptation when he characterized conservatism primarily as directed at 
preserving the status quo and liberalism largely as the movement toward reform. 4 
Such definitions however, are misleading and inadequate. Defining conservatism 
as being preoccupied with the preservation or protection of the status quo and 
liberalism as being largely, if not wholly, about reform does not explain aggressive 
judicial obstruction of economic.regulations in the name of conservatism or extreme 
judicial deference to progressive economic regulations on behalf of liberalism. 
A more useful characterization of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" would 
be to describe whether judges have supported or struck down programs and policies 
commonly associated with or reflecting "conservative" or "liberal" politics. Hence, 
the justices most commonly regarded as "conservative" in the 1930s were the "Four 
Horsemen" -Justices McReynolds, Butler, Sutlterland, and Van Devanter-who 
were widely regarded as "activists" because they voted to strike down laws 
reflecting "liberal" values, while the "liberal" justices of the era were Harlan Fiske 
Stone, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Louis Brandeis because they deferred to such 
legislation.5 Understanding how the terms conservative and liberal were bandied 
about in this fashion promotes some understanding of their significance, but this 
understanding is limited too, because it fails to provide a complete picture of 
judicial politics throughout the twentieth century. One ultimately needs to examine 
the political contexts in which these terms have been employed and the political 
purposes served by their usage to develop a more comprehensive picture. 
A useful starting point for developing this picture is the year 1900. In 1900, 
conservatism was on the verge of a serious confrontation with the forces of 
4 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R 13-15 
(1955). 
5 See infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text. 
2002] THE RHETORIC OF JUDICIAL CRITIQUE 589 
progressivism.6 In the national government, conservatism was represented most 
visibly in the form of the Fuller Court, which had provoked some strident public 
criticism for upholding economic due process claims to strike down business 
regulations in such cases as Allgeyer v. Louisiana and Lochner v. 
NewYork.7 
One of the most strident critics of the Court was the Republican President 
Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt had his own novel conception of conservatism. 
Roosevelt thought of himself as a conservative, though not in conventional terms.8 
For him, the true conservative had to be progressive in outlook. He believed "[t]he 
only true conservative is the man who resolutely sets his face to the future.''9 He 
was disturbed by the fact that during the 1890s the Republican Party had abandoned 
the "radical" posture that he believed was its birthright in national politics.10 In his 
view, the "foolish, ill-judged, mock radicalism" of the Democrats, populists, and 
socialists had pushed the Republican Party to fight for economic justice from a 
dangerously "conservative" and defensive position. 11 As president, Roosevelt 
openly worried that the Republican Party risked "fossilization," that is, a disastrous 
identification with the propertied classes rather than the common people whom 
Roosevelt saw as his most important constituency. 12 To help the Republican Party 
meet the demands posed by mass industrialization, national organization of the 
economy, and the rise of America as a world power, Roosevelt sought to make "an 
old party progressive again.'' 13 In short, the ''progressive position" that Roosevelt 
sought to stake out for himself and his administration was to be "conservative-
radicalism. "14 This formulation was a variation on a theme Roosevelt traced back 
to Edmund Burke, whom Roosevelt often liked to quote as acknowledging that 
6 For some useful overviews on political and constitutional thinking at or around the 
beginning of the last century, see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM 
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLEcnJAL VOYAGE 83-115 (2000); G. 
Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social 
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 59 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972), reprinted in G. 
EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 99-135 {1978). 
7 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
8 Progressives in Congress were no less enamored of the Court. They proposed, in vain, 
to require a two-thirds vote by the justices when striking down statutes, and permitting 
Congress to overrule the Court's decisions by a two-thirds majority. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, 
STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 363 (5th ed. 2000). 
9 JOHN MORTON BLUM, THEREPUBUCANROOSEVELTS (2ded.1972)(citationomitted). 
IO STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 235 (2d ed. 1997) ( citation 
omitted). 
11 Id. (citation omitted). 
12 Id. (citation omitted). 
13 Id. at 236 (citation omitted). 
14 Letter to Sydney Brooks (Nov. 20, 1908), in SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 237. 
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"[t]here is a state to preserve as well a state to refonn." 15 
Roosevelt viewed the advent of economic due process as a threat to his 
"conservative-radicalism."16 As president, Roosevelt frequently denounced the 
Supreme Court as "conservative and hidebound."17 As president, he yearned to 
appoint "liberal" justices who would support the progressive policies of his 
administration. 18 He did not hesitate to denounce his appointees, including Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, when they failed to vote as he hoped.19 
Roosevelt's "conservative-radicalism," and particularly his antipathy to judicial 
activism, eventually placed him at odds with his chosen successor, William Howard 
Taft. Not long after Taft became president in 1908, Roosevelt concluded that Taft 
was betraying Roosevelt's brand of conservatism. By 1910, Roosevelt complained 
that Taft had "not proved [to be] a good leader, in spite of his having been a good 
15 See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Address Before the Opening of the Jamestown Exposition 
(Apr. 26, 1907), 6 WORKS 1213-28, in SKOWRONEK, supra note 10, at 237. 
16 See, e.g. Theodore Roosevelt, Criticism of the Courts, THE OUTLOOK, XVI 149-53 
(Sept. 24, 1910), reprinted in HOWARD FURER, 5 THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: 
THE FULLER COURT 1888-1910, at 213 (George J. Lankevich ed., 1986): 
Id. 
All who are acquainted with the effort to remedy industrial abuses know the 
type of mind (it may be perfectly honest, but is absolutely fossilized), which 
declines to allow us to work for the betterment of conditions among the wage 
earners on the ground that we must not interfere with the "liberty" of a girl to 
work under conditions which jeopardize life and limb, or the "liberty" of a man 
to work under conditions which ruin his health after a limited number of years 
.... The decision was nominally against states' rights, but was really against 
popular rights. 
17 HENRY J.ABRAHAM,JUSTICES,PRESIDENTS,ANDSENATORS: AHISTORYOFTHEU.S. 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 117 (rev. ed. 1999) 
(citation omitted in original). 
18 On this subject, Roosevelt wrote to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge: "I should hold 
myself as guilty of an irreparable wrong to the nation ifl should put [on the Court] any man 
who was not absolutely sane and sound on the great national policies for which we stand in 
public life." 2 SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND 
HENRY CABOT LoDGE, 1884-1918, at 519 (H.C. Lodge & C.F. Redmond eds., 1925), 
reprinted in HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 157 (3d ed. 1992). For Roosevelt, those policies 
included support for labor, anti-trust laws, improved race relations, and increased regulatory 
power of the national government. 
19 In response to Holmes's opinions in a series of antitrust cases that went against 
administration policy, Roosevelt fumed: "I could carve out of a banana a Judge with more 
backbone than that!" ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 69 (citation omitted). 
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first lieutenant. "20 In 1911, Roosevelt derided Taft as "a flubdub with a streak of 
second-rate and the common in him, and he has not the slightest idea of what is 
necessary if this country is to make social and industrial progress."21 
Roosevelt's concerns about Taft's Supreme Court appointees' rigid adherence 
to economic due process and to the possible radicalism of Woodrow Wilson's 
appointees22 fortified his decision to run as a third-party presidential candidate in 
1912. In February of that year, Roosevelt declared, "I ... emphatically protest 
against any theory that would make of the Constitution a means of thwarting instead 
of securing the absolute right of the people to rule themselves and provide for their 
social and industrial well-being, ... 'whether on the bench, in the legislature or in 
executive office. ,,,23 In June, Roosevelt rallied his supporters for the Republican 
Convention with the cry, "we stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord."24 
His platform as a third-party candidate included a controversial plea for the judicial 
recall of federal judges. This plea triggered a widespread critical reaction, 
including grumbling from a New York conservative that Roosevelt's attack "had 
startled all thoughtful men and impressed them with the frightful danger which lies 
in his political ascendancy[,]''25 as well as from the Republican leadership, in the 
person of William Howard Taft.26 
On the public stage, Roosevelt was hardly alone in condemning judicial 
activism (in those days often synonymous with economic due process). As early as 
1894, Oregon Governor Sylvester Pennoyer launched a blistering attack on the 
20 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Gifford Pinchot (June 28, 1910), in LEWIS L. 
GoULD, REFORM AND REGULATION: AMERICAN POLITICS FROM ROOSEVELT TO WILSON 135 
(2d ed. 1986). 
21 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (Aug. 22, 1911), in 
GoULD,supra note 20, at 149. 
22 See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
23 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT & CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY: THE OLD 
LEGALITY 1889-1932, at 159 (1969) (citation omitted). 
24 Theodore Roosevelt, Address on the Eve of the Republican Convention of 19 I 2, N. Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 1912, in WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD 
DoUGLASS WHITE, 1910-1921, at 2 ( 1999). 
25 GoULD, supra note 21, at 139 (citation omitted in original). 
26 In response to these attacks, Taft stated: "What distinguishes this country from any 
other one is the Supreme Court ... and to turn on that Court ... and attack it seems to me 
to lay the axe at the root of the tree of our civilization." N.Y. EVENING POST, Oct. 6, 1911, 
at 1, in ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 57 (1964). Taft also 
portrayed Roosevelt as one of a group of"extremists" who were "not progressives ... [but] 
political emotionalists or neurotics." GoULD, supra note 20, at 154. In private 
correspondence, Taft candidly revealed his fundamental concerns about Roosevelt. In July 
1912, be wrote that "[Roosevelt] is really the greatest menace to our institutions that we have 
had in a long time - indeed I don't remember one in our history so dangerous and so 
powerful because of his hold upon the less intelligent votes and the discontented." HERBERT 
S. DUFFY, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 299 (1930). 
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Fuller Court's protection of property rights. He declared: 
We have during this time been living under a government not based 
upon the Federal Constitution, but under one created by the plausible 
sophistries of John Marshall. The Supreme Court has not contented 
itself with its undisputed judicial prerogative of interpreting the laws of 
Congress which may be ambiguous, but it has usurped the legislative 
prerogative of declaring what the laws shall not be. Our constitutional 
government has been supplanted by a judicial oligarchy.27 
A less vitriolic, but no less severe, critique came from Labor leader Samuel 
Gompers, who stated in 1913: 
It took years to secure relief from the old conspiracy laws which curbed 
and restricted the workers in protecting and promoting their industrial 
rights and interests. When at last it seemed that efforts of the toilers 
were to be rewarded, then the Supreme Court of the United States, by an 
interpretation which amounted to judicial legislation, applied the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Law to trade unions in a way which virtually 
revived the conspiracy laws.28 
Similarly, the Socialist Party included the following plank in its 1912 campaign 
platform: "The abolition of the power usurped by the Supreme Court of the United 
States to pass upon the constitutionality of the legislation enacted by Congress. 
National laws to be repealed only by act of Congress or by a referendum vote of the 
whole people."29 
In addition to the harsh criticism of the Court by many political leaders, there 
was significant critical reaction to judicial activism within the legal academy, 
magazines, and the judiciary. Harvard Law School Professor James Thayer became 
an early, influential critic of the judicial activism that economic due process 
spawned.30 In the same year that Justice David Brewer gave a fiery address at the 
American Bar Association in defense of judicial opposition to ''the red flag of 
27 Sylvester Pennoyer, The Income Tax Decision, and the Power of the Supreme Court 
to Nullify Acts of Congress, 29 AM. L. REV. 550, 558 (1895), reprinted in 2 CHARLES 
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 703 ( 1937) ( emphasis added). 
28 Letter from Samuel Gompers to President Woodrow Wilson, reprinted in NOIMAN 
BINDLER, 6 THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE CoNSERVATIVE COURT 1910-
1930, at 67 (George J. Lankevicb ed., 1986). 
29 Socialist Party Platform (1912), reprinted in NORMAN BINDLER, 6 THE SUPREME 
COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE CONSERVATIVE COURT, 1910-1930, at 91 (George J. 
Lankevicb ed., 1986). 
30 ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 42 (1964). 
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Socialism, inviting a redistribution of property,"31 Thayer urged judicial restraint. 32 
He warned that judicial review did not imply judicial supremacy. In the face of 
Justice Brewer's inflammatory call to "strengthen the judiciary,"33 Thayer pleaded 
instead for principled judicial restraint. He declared: 
[Judicial self-restraint] recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, 
ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem 
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so 
to another; that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; 
that there is often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases the 
constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, 
but leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational 
is constitutional. 34 
According to Thayer, the judicial function was "merely that of fixing the outside 
border of reasonable legislative action[. ]"35 Power of such modest dimension would 
leave courts "a great and stately jurisdiction. It will only imperil the whole of it, if 
it is sought to give them more. "36 
The article was more than just an academic exercise, for Thayer's thinking on 
the legitimacy of judicial review would influence a generation of Harvard Law 
School graduates, including his colleague Holmes, as well as Learned Hand, Louis 
Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter.37 Indeed, as a Supreme Court justice, Holmes 
31 Id. (citation omitted in original). 
32 See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 1 HARV. L. REV. 129, 156 (1893): 
Id. 
[T]he safe and pennanent road towards reform is that of impressing upon our 
people a far stronger sense than they have of the great range of possible hann and 
evil that our system leaves open, and must leave open, to the legislatures, and of the 
clear limits of judicial power; so that responsibility may be brought sharply home 
where it belongs. 
33 DavidJ. Brewer, The Nation's Safeguard, 16PROC. N.Y. ST. B.A. 37, 37-47 (1893), 
reprinted in MASON, supra note 30, at 43. 
34 Thayer, supra note 32, at 144. 
35 Id. at 148. 
36 Id. at 152. 
37 See G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U -~-REV. 48 ( 1993); 
In the early twentieth century, Thayer's essay ... was 'discovered' by a group of 
'·progressive' legal scholars and policymakers, personified by Felix Frankfurter, 
and introduced into the canons of 'approved' constitutional scholarship. Thayer's 
essay was read as endorsing a deferential posture for judges ... and applauded as 
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became the leading advocate for judicial restraint and against judicial activism.38 
Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New York:39 was, both then and now, generally 
regarded as a major attack on activism. He echoed this same theme repeatedly in 
his private correspondence,40 as well as in public addresses.41 A more colorful 
example of Holmes' s commitment to judicial restraint came in an exchange with 
John W. Davis in 1916 regarding a series of cases dealing with the Sherman Anti-
a prescient exemplar of judicial self-restraint. 
Id. at 48-49. 
38 See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 352-53 (1982) 
(describing Holmes's attacks on judicial activism). 
39 For example, Holmes wrote: 
(A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether 
of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. 
It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our 
fmding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not 
to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them 
conflict with the Constitution of the United States. 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting), overruled by 
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
40 In 1910, Holmes wrote to long-time confidant Sir Frederick Pollock: "I am so 
sceptical [sic] as to our knowledge about the goodness or badness of laws that I have no 
practical criticism except what the crowd wants. Personally I bet that the crowd if it knew 
more wouldn't want what it does - but that is immaterial." Letter from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (Apr. 23, 1910), in l HOLMES-POLl.OCK LETTERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR[.] JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 
163 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). Holmes again expresses this sentiment in a 1914 
letter to Felix Frankfurter, writing: 
I quite agree that a law should be called good if it reflects the will of the dominant 
forces of the community even if it will take us to hell. But if one sees that result 
clearly, one may suspect that the community would change its will if it had the 
same wisdom. 
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 24, 1914), in HOLMES AND 
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 19 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine 
L. Compston eds., 1996). 
41 For example, in a speech at Harvard in 1913, Holmes stated: "It is a misfortune ifa 
judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely 
into the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half his 
fellow men to be wrong." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, Address at a Dinner 
of the Harvard Law School Association (Feb. 15, 1913), reprinted in NORMAN BINDLER, 6 
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE CONSERVATIVE COURT 1910-1930, at 62-64 
(George J. Lankevich ed., 1986). 
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Trust Act. Holmes said: "Of course I know and every other sensible man knows 
that the Sherman law is damned nonsense, but if my fellow citizens want to go to 
hell, I am here to help them - it's my job."42 Whether it reflected pragmatism, 
consequentialism, or some other more esoteric view of the world,43 Holmes's 
antipathy to judicial activism and calls for judicial restraint became nationally 
synonymous with a "liberal" outlook. 
After his elevation to the Court, Wilson's friend and Supreme Court appointee 
Louis Brandeis joined Holmes in attacking judicial activism (that interfered with 
economic reform) and defending judicial restraint. One of the few areas in which 
they both saw a legitimate role for judicial interference with democratic enactments 
was the First Amendment, though more often than not, they joined in dissent.44 
Holmes's and Brandeis's frequent agreement in civil liberties cases, as well as in 
opposing judicial activism in business regulation cases, helped to cultivate their 
joint reputations publicly as "liberals.'t45 
Learned Hand, too, joined the attack on economic due process. In 1908, in the 
pages of the Harvard Law Review, he wrote: 
42 GARY J. AICHELE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.: SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, JUOOE 140 
(John Milton Cooper, Jr., ed., 1989) (citation omitted). 
43 For conflicting views on the philosophic underpinnings of Holmes' s judicial outlook, 
see ALBERT w. AL.SCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VAWES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES (2000); Louis MEN AND, THE METAPHYSICAL ewe (2001 ). 
44 See, e.K., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., 
dissenting) (holding New York statute against "criminal anarchy" not violative of the First 
Amendment); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(holding the distribution of pamphlets advocating resistance to World War I in violation of 
the Espionage Act as not being protected by the First Amendment); Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding the distribution ofa circular advocating draft dodging 
in violation of the Espionage Act as not being protected by the First Amendment). 
45 A 1927 newspaper article concluded: 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Dembitz Brandeis ... have achieved a spiritual 
kinship that marks them off as a separate liberal chamber of the Supreme Court. On 
the great issues that go down to the fundamental differences in the philosophy of 
government these two are nearly always together; often they are together against 
the rest of the court. · 
Charles G. Ross, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 19, 1927, in SAMUELJ, KONEFSKY, THE 
LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 94 (1956) (citation omitted). The frequent labeling of 
Holmes as a "liberal" in his time drew the ire of H.L. Mencken, who in 1955 wrote that 
"[t]he Liberals, ... who long for tickling with a great and tragic longing, were occasionally 
lifted to the heights of ecstasy by the learned judge's operations, and in fact soared so high 
that they were out of earshot of next day's thwack of the club." Hadley Arkes, Lochner v. 
New York and the Cast of Our Laws, in GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94, 116 
(Robert P. George ed., 2000) (citation omitted) [hereinafter GREAT CASES]. 
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It is not, however, necessary that the consideration by the court of the 
expediency of a statute should be such as would be given if the whole 
question were before it as a legislature in the first instance .... The nearest 
analogy for the function of the court is the function of a court in review of 
a verdict on the facts. Only in those cases in which it is obvious beyond 
peradventure that the statute was the result, either of passion or of 
ignorance or folly, can the court say that it was not due process of law. In 
this way the principle may be observed that with the expediency of the 
statute the court has no concern, but only with the power of the 
legislature.46 
·Privately, Hand expressed his agreement with Roosevelt's condemnation of judicial 
obstructionism.47 Even more importantly for Hand's future, his attack caught the 
attention of Taft's Attorney General, George Wickersham, who helped to secure 
Hand an appointment as a federal district judge.48 Later, after becoming chief 
justice, Taft opposed elevating Hand to the Supreme Court because of his age and 
his strident opposition to economic due process.49 
In 1913, historian Charles Warren described the political controversy 
enveloping the Supreme Court at the time: 
During the past two years, there has been much agitation directed against 
the Supreme Court of the United States, frequent reference to "judicial 
oligarchy," ''usurpation" and the like, and demands for fundamental 
changes in the judicial system under the Constitution, not only of the States 
but of the United States.50 
Warren explained that the years 1887 to 1911 "constituted the period most 
productive of progressive and liberal - even radical - social and economic 
legislation in the United States."51 He noted the Court had struck down laws for 
violating the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses in only three cases, 52 though 
46 Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 2 I HARV. L. REv. 495, 
499-500 (1908) (internal citations omitted). 
47 0See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 212-13 ( 1994) 
( describing and quoting from exchanges between Hand and Roosevelt on judicial activism 
and the propriety of judicial recall). 
48 Id. at 129-33. 
49 Id. at 239, 274-75. 
50 Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 CO LUM. 
L. REV. 294,294 (1913), in PRATT,supra note 24, at 7. 
51 Id. 
52 Warren suggested those three decisions were Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
( 1905), Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., I 84 U.S. 540 (1902), and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 
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he conceded that the Supreme Court had struck down laws thirty-four times to 
protect private property rights during the same period. 
Although the decisions in which the Fuller and White Courts took on politically 
charged issues were relatively small in number, the criticism of the Supreme Court 
grew increasingly harsh during the first couple decades of the twentieth century. 
By 1921, at the end of Edward Douglass White's tenure as chief justice, a 
contemporary observer suggested that the: 
[H]istorian of the future will probably say that at the time Mr. White was 
appointed Chief Justice, the Supreme Court, as well as the entire judiciary 
in America, was passing through the most distinct crisis in its history. The 
public had become suddenly distrustful of our courts and resented the 
absolute power of the judicial veto. Recall of judges as well as recall of 
judicial decisions was one of the flaming issues of the day. Indeed, 
antagonism to the power of judges was one of the basic creeds of a nascent 
political faith. 53 
Perhaps no one defended the Court more vigorously against this "antagonism" than 
William Howard Taft. The path by which Taft came to lead the Court and the 
direction in which he helped to lead it are extremely important for understanding 
the meanings of both conservatism and liberalism prior to the New Deal. 
II. TAFT ANDTHETAFTCOURT, 1921-30 
It is hard to imagine anyone matching the extraordinary public service of 
William Howard Taft. From 1881 to 1930, he served as a public prosecutor and 
state court judge in Ohio, Solicitor General of the United States, circuit court judge, 
Governor General of the Philippines, Secretary of War, President of the United 
States, Yale Law School professor, President of the American Bar Association, and 
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.54 In all of these positions, he had 
unique opportunities to articulate and advance his conservative constitutional 
vision. 
Taft developed his judicial philosophy relatively early in life and asserted it 
consistently throughout his career. In a well-publicized speech before the American 
Bar Association in 1895, Taft, then a circuit judge, tried to refute charges that the 
federal courts had "flagrantly usurped jurisdiction, first, to protect corporations and 
perpetuate their many uses, and second, to oppress and destroy the power of 
165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
s3 Samuel Spring, Two Chief Justices: Edward Douglass White and William Howard 
Taft, 64 THE AM. REV. OF REVS. 163-64 (Aug. 1921), in PRATT, supra note 24, at 8. 
s4 See generally MASO~, supra note 30,passim. 
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organized labor. "55 He suggested the federal courts were being "subjected to the 
most severe criticism without just grounds, merely because of the character of their 
jurisdiction."56 He explained that"[ c ]ourts are but conservators; they cannot effect 
great social and political changes. Corporations there must be if we would 
progress; accumulation of wealth there will be if private property continues the 
keystone of our society. "57 Thus, he believed legislation to regulate the excesses of 
private property must be narrow in scope. The excesses oflabor were, in his view, 
more amenable to judicial action because courts had the authority to issue 
injunctions when labor violated property rights. 
In a lecture at Yale in 1906, Taft recalled fondly his opinions upon his own 
graduation from Yale in 1878: 
The tendency in my own case ... was toward the laissez faire doctrine 
that the least interference by legislation with the operation of natural 
laws was, in the end, the best for the public; that the only proper object 
oflegislation was to free the pathway of commerce and opportunity from 
the effect of everything but competition and enlightened selfishness; and 
that being done, the Government had discharged all of its proper 
functions. 58 
He reiterated this same philosophy in 1912 in making the case for the Republican 
Party to pick him, rather than Roosevelt, as its standard-bearer: 
I believe I represent a safer and saner view of our government and its 
constitution than does Theodore Roosevelt, and ... I mean to continue 
to labor ... to uphold them and ... to stamp out the pernicious theory 
that the method of reforming the defects in a representative government 
is to impose more numerous and more burdensome political duties upon 
the people when their inability properly to discharge their present duties 
is the cause of every ground of complaint. 59 
55 William Howard Taft, Criticisms of the Federa/Judiciary, Annual Address Delivered 
Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 28, 1895), in XXIV AM. L. REV. 641-74 (1895), 
in MASON, supra note 30, at 47. The charges were directed at the Court's hampering 
enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, barring a direct federal income tax, upholding 
the injunction-contempt power of the federal courts, and legitimizing economic due process. 
56 Id. at 47-48 (citation omitted in original). 
57 Id. at 48 (citation omitted in original). 
58 William Howard Taft, Administration of Criminal Law, Address to the Graduating 
Class of Yale Law School (June 26, 1905), in WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, PRESENT DAY 
PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION OF ADDRESSES DELIVERED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS 335-55 
(1905). 
59 HERBERTS. DUFFY, WILLIAM HOWARD TAIT 276-77 (1930). 
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Though defeated in his re-election bid, Taft never wavered in his convictions and 
never hesitated thereafter to rally his political allies and to take strong public stands 
whenever necessary in opposition to judicial nominations that would dilute judicial 
protection of private property. 
Perhaps Taft's most widely publicized stand against a nomination he regarded 
as dangerous to the Constitution was his dramatic opposition to Louis Brandeis's 
nomination to the Court.60 The fact that Brandeis was nominally a Republican made 
no difference to Taft, whose concerns about prospective judicial nominees were 
always about their "real politics."61 Brandeis's "real politics" were anathema to 
Taft. He wrote to one of his aides that Brandeis's nomination represented "one of 
the deepest wounds" that he had sustained "as an American and a lover of the 
Constitution and a believer in progressive conservatism [that] when you consider 
... that men were pressing [him] for the place, [it is ridiculous].',62 Taft saw 
Brandeis as "a muckraker, an emotionalist for his own purposes, a socialist ... a 
man who has certain high ideals in his imagination ... of great tenacity of purpose 
and, in my judgment, of much power for evil .... "63 . Taft further complained that, 
in nominating Brandeis, Wilson was "seeking to break down the guaranties [sic] of 
the Constitution,"64 and Taft predicted a "catastrophe ... will come to this country 
in having the Supreme Court reorganized by him.',65 
60 To his brother, Taft wrote: "I am deeply concerned to have such an insidious devil on 
the Court .... "LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 214 ( 1983 ). Taft took the even more extreme step 
of being signatory to a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, dated February 7, 1916, 
stating: "[T]aking into view the reputation, character and professional career of Mr. Louis 
D. Brandeis, he is not a fit person to be a member of the Supreme Court of the United 
States." 2 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON 
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1972,at 1226 (RoyM. Mersky& J. MyronJacobstein 
eds., 1975). 
61 See generally MASON, supra note 30. 
62 Id. at 72 (citation omitted). There is also evidence that Roosevelt was against the 
nomination of Brandeis as well. In a letter discussing the nomination, Senator Lodge, a well-
known Roosevelt confidant, wrote: "I did not know that Mr. Brandeis, who has been in and 
out of all political parties and of late has been a staunch Democrat, had such a hold on 
Progressives. I know one Progressive who is pretty thoroughly against him, and that is 
Theodore Roosevelt." A.L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF LoUJS D. BRANDEIS 88 
(1964). It should be noted that Todd later writes: "Despite a careful search, I was unable to 
find any confirmation of Senator Lodge's statement that ... Theodore Roosevelt was 'pretty 
thoroughly against' Brandeis." Id. at 257. 
63 Letter from William Howard Taft to Gus Karger (Jan. 31, 1916), in MASON, supra 
note 30, at 72. 
64 Letter from William Howard Taft to Robert Winslow (Oct. 21, 1916), in 2 HENRYF. 
PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 899 (1964). 
65 Id. at 898. 
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As president and later as President Harding's choice for chief justice, Taft 
strived to ensure the appointments of justices who would wholeheartedly 
"maint[ain] the Supreme Court as the bulwark to enforce the guaranty that no man 
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.''66 Harding's three 
other appointees- George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Edward Sanford- were 
all chosen because they were thought to be rigidly committed to securing the Court 
in discharging this function.67 Consequently, the Taft Court became the most 
consistently conservative Court in philosophy and outcomes of any Court in the 
twentieth century until a working majority of five Republican justices coalesced on 
the Rehnquist Court. 68 
Though relatively brief in its duration, the Taft Court was distinctive for several 
reasons. First, the Court struck down an unprecedented number of state and federal 
economic regulations. As Robert McCloskey observed: 
In the 1920-29 period the number of negative decisions under the 
Fourteenth Amendment was almost double the number in the preceding 
decade. These figures themselves suggest some change in the 
constitutional climate, and the suggestion is confirmed by examination 
of individual decisions. True, a great many economic statutes still 
survived the judicial ordeal; prudent self-restraint was still an important 
Court theme. But the temper of the times, signalized by conservative 
Republican electoral triumphs and by the withering of the progressive 
spirit in public policy, was infectious. The spread of the infection was 
made somewhat more likely by the coming of men like Taft, Sutherland, 
and Butler to the bench, for all of them were deeply convinced foes of 
the welfare state. Now the judges were confident that they spoke for the 
66 William Howard Taft, Mr. Wilson and the Campaign, 10 YALE L. REV. 19-20 ( 1920), 
in MASON, supra note 30, at 158. 
67 Chief Justice Taft actively pursued the role of presidential advisor on judicial 
selection. He explained to President Harding and his attorney general that "I presume I have 
a legitimate right to possess the President of such information as I think useful, if he desires 
to receive it." Letter from William Howard Taft to C.D. Hilles (Nov. 4, 1923), in MASON, 
supra note 31, at 160. For his part, President Harding was insecure in his ability to nominate 
justices and wrote to Taft: "I am very glad to have you convey to me the information which 
comes to you. I am anxious, of course, to make a thoroughly high-grade and satisfactory 
nomination." Letter from Warren G. Harding to William Howard Taft (Nov. 2, 1922), in 
MASON, supra note 30, at 161. Furthermore, Attorney General Daugherty wrote to Taft, 
assuring him that Harding "would not approve anybody who was not approved by [the chief 
justice]." Letter from H. W. Taft to William Howard Taft (Oct. 26, 1922), in MASON, supra 
note 30, at 173. 
68 See infra notes 252-66 and accompanying text. 
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nation when they defended laissez faire. 69 
The second distinctive feature of the Taft Court's approach to due process and 
equal protection claims was that it generally had a unified, if not coherent, 
constitutional vision. The chief spokespersons and architects in expressing this 
vision were Chief Justice Taft and Justice Sutherland. One of the few instances in 
which the two divided was in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.10 Much more often 
than not, a majority of the Taft Court consistently took a fonnal approach to due 
process and equal protection questions grounded in a judicially cognizable, virtually 
absolute fundamental right ofproperty.71 
Third, the Taft Court's protection of due process rights extended, for the first 
time in the Court's history, outside of the economic sphere. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 12 
most of the justices joined together to recognize a fundamental right to bar state or 
local government from eliminating Gennan in public schools or private schools 
altogether. Two years later the Taft Court, in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,13 
enjoined enforcement of a statute that would have made parents criminally liable 
for sending their children to private schools. 
The common link among Meyer, Pierce, and the economic due process cases 
was the Taft Court's distrust of popular majorities. As early as 1913, Taft wrote 
69 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 106 (Daniel J. Boorstin 
ed., 2d ed. 1994). 
70 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). Compare the opinion of Justice Sutherland for the Court, which included 
extensive quotes from Lochner and concluded that "[ s ]ubsequent cases in this court have 
been distinguished from that decision, but the principles therein stated have never been 
disapproved," id. at 550, with the dissent filed by Chief Justice Taft in which he stated: 
It is impossible for me to reconcile the Bunting Case [Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 
426 (1917) (approving maximum hours legislation for factory workers)] and the 
Lochner Case, and I have always supposed that the Lochner Case was thus 
overruled sub silentio. Yet the opinion of the court herein in support of its 
conclusion quotes from the opinion in the Lochner Case as one which bas been 
sometimes distinguished but never overruled. Certainly there was no attempt to 
distinguish it in the Bunting Case. 
Id. at 564 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). 
71 See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (holding a school district's decision 
to send a student of Chinese descent to a colored school was not violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (holding a 
Nebraska law fixing the weights of loaves of bread arbitrary and unconstitutional); Truax 
v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (holding an Arizona law prohibiting employers from 
getting injunctions against striking employees violative of the Equal Protection Clause). 
72 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
73 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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that radical refonners counted on ''the willingness of an inflamed majority to 
possess themselves of advantages 9ver a minority, or the individual. "74 In 1914, 
Taft explained: 
Those ofus who insist upon the preservation of constitutional limitations 
upon the action of a majority ... are convinced that we are the best 
friends of popular government . . . [C]onstitutions are the self-imposed 
restraints of a whole people upon a majority of them to secure sober 
action and a respect for the rights of the minority.75 
The fourth and distinctive feature of the Taft Court was its dissenters. On the 
Taft Court, the dissenters were largely united in opposing economic due process; 
however, it was not clear where they would draw the line precisely on the point 
beyond which a legislature could not go in drafting social or economic legislation. 76 
The sharp jurisprudential differences among the justices of the Taft Court 
reflected increasing hostilities within the Court. The Chief Justice especially 
distrusted dissent. When Brandeis dissented in Myers v. United States,11 for 
example, Taft listed him among that "class of people that have no loyalty to the 
[C]ourt and sacrifice almost everything to the gratification of their own publicity 
and wish to stir up dissatisfaction with the decision of the [C]ourt, if they don't 
happen to agree with it."78 Though initially supportive of President Coolidge's 
appointment of Harlan Fiske Stone to the Court in 1925, Taft grew to distrust Stone, 
based on Stone's frequent alignments with Holmes and Brandeis. Taft equally 
distrusted Herbert Hoover. Shortly before his retirement from the Court in 1930, 
Taft expressed his concerns that "if a number of us died, Hoover would put in some 
rather extreme destroyers of the Constitution."79 
The discontent of the dissenters hardly was confined to the pages of the 
Supreme Court Reports. The Taft Court had more than its fair share of public 
critics. For instance, in 1921, The New Republic published an unsigned editorial 
74 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, POPULAR GoVERNMENT: ITS ESSENCE, ITS PERMANENCE, 
AND ITS PERILS 233 (1913), in MASON, supra note 30, at 57. 
75 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT ( 1914), in 
MASON, supra note 30, at 60. 
76 For example, Stone split with Brandeis and Holmes and joined the "conservative" 
majority in the major First Amendment cases of the day: Whitney v. California, 214 U.S. 
357 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); and Git/ow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
77 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding a congressional act requiring the consent of the Senate 
to remove various classes of postmasters violative of Article II of the Constitution). 
78 Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Oct. 27, 1926), in HENRY F. 
PRINGLE, 2 THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 1025 ( 1939) ( citation omitted). 
79 MASON, supra note 30, at 70. 
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that lamented ''the present temporary triumph of reaction. "80 The author - none 
other than Felix Frankfurter - continued: 
Labor is cowed, liberalism is confused, and the country's thinking 
generally is done in the storm cellar . . . . But ... [ c ]ases involving the 
social control allowed the states under the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, 
or the exercise of federal power for police purposes ... will soon again 
call forth a clash of differing conceptions of policy and of the proper 
scope of the Court's ultimate veto power .... 81 
Similarly, in 1922, a despairing Woodrow Wilson pleaded with Justice John H. 
Clark not to retire, citing the menace of Taft's conservative activism. He wrote: 
Like thousands of other liberals throughout the country, I have been 
counting on the influence of you and Justice Brandeis to restrain the 
Court in some measure from the extreme reactionary course which it 
seems inclined to follow . . . . The most obvious and immediate danger 
to which we are exposed is that the courts will more and more outrage 
the people's sense of justice and cause a revulsion against judicial 
authority which may seriously disturb the equilibrium of our institutions, 
and I can see nothing which can save us from this danger if the Supreme 
Court is to repudiate liberal courses of thought and action. 82 
In 1924, a North Dakota judge expressed what many liberals of the times had been 
thinking when he suggested: "It is our judges who formulate our public policies and 
our basic law . . . . We are governed by our judges and not by our legislatures. "83 
In 1930, Frankfurter no longer remained anonymous in criticizing the Court, 
though his criticisms had become more intense. He wrote: 
Since 1920, the Court has invalidated more legislation than in [the] fifty 
years preceding. Views that were antiquated twenty-five years ago have 
been resurrected in decisions nullifying minimum wage laws for women 
in industry, a standard-weight bread law to protect buyers from short 
weights and honest bakers from unfair competition, a law fixing the 
resale of the price of theater tickets by scalpers, laws controlling the 
exploitation of the unemployed by employment agencies and many tax 
80 Mr. Chief Justice Taft, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 27, 1921, at 230. 
81.Jd. 
82 MASON, supra note 30, at 165 (citation omitted in original). 
83 ANDREW A. BRUCE, THE AMERICAN JUDGE 6, 8 ( 1924). 
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laws.84 
For Frankfurter, this was a disastrous tum of events, particularly because the sheer 
number of laws struck down did not fully tell the tale of the Taft Court. He 
explained: 
[I]n the first place, all laws are not of the same importance. Secondly, 
a single decision may decide the fate of a great body of legislation : .. 
. Moreover, the discouragement of legislative efforts through a 
particular adverse decision and the general weakening of the sense of 
legislative responsibility are destructive influences not measurable by 
statistics. 85 
Despite the derision, Chief Justice Taft staunchly defended the Court's 
conservative activism throughout his tenure. In 1922, he explained: "It is better to 
endure wrongs than to effect disastrous changes in which the proposed remedy may 
be worse than the evil. "86 By the end of his tenure, as his health was failing, he 
confessed to his son that "[t]he truth is that Hoover is a Progre~sive, just as Stone 
is, and just as Brandeis is and just as Holmes is.',s7 Though Taft never lived to see 
it, his worst fears were about to be realized. 
ill. THE HUGHES COURT, 1930-41 
The Hughes Court was a transitional court. It stands roughly in the middle -
not just chronologically, but also in terms of judicial philosophy and outcomes -
between the Taft Court's persistent, formalistic defense of property rights and the 
Stone and Vinson Courts' absolute deference to economic regulations. The series 
of cases in which this transition unfolded is as well documented and analyzed as 
any in American constitutional history. 
The transition was made possible by a number of forces, one of the most 
underrated having been the pressure applied to President Hoover to forego 
appointing conservative ideologues like Taft or Sutherland to the Court. The 
clearest illustration of the success of this pressure is the fact that Hoover was the 
first president in the twentieth century to have had a Supreme Court nominee 
rejected by the Senate. Though Hoover's nominee John Parker, a Fourth Circuit 
84 Felix Frankfurter, The United States Supreme Court Molding the Constitution, 
CURRENT HISTORY, May 1930, at 239. 
BS Id. 
86 Wll.llAM HOWARD TAFT, LIBERTY UNDER LAW 21 ( 1921 ). 
87 Letter from W.H. Taft to Horace Taft (Dec. 1, 1929), in PRINGLE, supra note 78, at 
967. 
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judge, was generally well-regarded by the legal community, liberal interest groups 
organized a campaign against him. They helped to forge fatal opposition against 
the nomination by a coalition of Democrats and progressive Republicans.BB At the 
time, Parker's defeat was "generally interpreted as a blow at conservatism;',s9 he 
was, as Harlan Fiske Stone observed, a "victim of the circumstances [ of his 
nomination] ... .',9° The circumstances in question were the growing political 
discontent with aggressive judicial protection of private property rights at the 
expense of economic reform. 
Even when the Senate accepted Hoover's Supreme Court nominees, it exacted 
a price. After Parker's rejection, President Hoover nominated Owen Roberts 
largely because he knew senators from both parties would agree on Roberts, who 
had served with distinction as a special prosecutor investigating some of the 
scandals of the Harding Administration. Later, in 1932, when Hoover's power 
(even within his own party) was at its lowest, Senate leaders warned Hoover that 
the only acceptable nomination he could make to replace the retiring Justice Holmes 
was Benjamin Cardozo.91 Hoover resisted because Cardozo's well-publicized 
opposition to the Taft Court's activism and critiques of economic due process 
clearly marked him as a "liberal.',92 Hoover relented and appointed Cardozo to the 
Cou11. 
Hoover's nomination of Charles Evans Hughes as chief justice ran into nearly 
as much flak as his similarly-timed nomination of John Parker as an associate 
justice. Because of the strong support of both of New York's senators, Hughes's 
nomination avoided serious trouble. Yet, its success was not due to the absence of 
strong-willed opposition. After initially signaling he would support the Hughes 
nomination, Senator George Norris, a prominent progressive Republican, led the 
opposition to Hughes. He explained that, inter alia, "[we] have reached a time in 
.our history when the power and influence of monopoly and organized wealth are 
reaching into every governmental activity . . . . Perhaps ... it is not far amiss to say 
that no man in public life so exemplifies the influence of powerful combinations in 
the political and financial world as does Mr. Hughes.',93 Robert La Follette, another 
prominent progressive Republican, warned that in expressing opinions on Hughes' s 
nominations, senators "are filling the jury box which ultimately will decide the 
88 In 1930, the Republican-controlled Senate rejected Fourth CircuitJudge John Parker's 
nomination as an associate justice by a vote of 41-39. 
89 ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 300 (1956) 
[hereinafter, MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE]. 
90 Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to His Sons, Apr. 18, Apr. 30, 1930, in MASON, 
HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 300 (internal quotations omitted). 
91 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 173-74 (2000). 
92 See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 465-67 (1998). 
93 72 CONG.REC. 3373 (1930), in MASON, HARLANFISKESTONE,supra note 89,at297. 
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issue between organized greed and the rights of the masses of this country. If that 
be the situation, the Court is responsible for it."94 Echoing the views of many 
senators, Senator Carter Glass reviewed some of Hughes' s opinions from his tenure 
as an associate justice to illustrate how "the Supreme Court in recent years has gone 
far afield from its original function and has constituted itself a court in economics 
and in the determination of social questions rather than the interpretation of statutes 
passed with reference to the Constitution itself.''95 According to Mason, Hughes's 
opponents pointed out that the Court had become "a great political body, appointed 
very often through political influence, passing on political questions, fixing policies 
for the people, legislating when they should leave that to Congress. "96 Senator 
Norris stated the problem directly: The Court had become "another legislative body 
[ consisting] of nine men; and they are more powerful than all the other[ legislative 
bodies] put together."97 Hughes, like Parker, was opposed less for anything he had 
done wrong, but rather because his appointment would reinforce, in Senator 
Clarence Dill's estimation: 
[A] judicial system of law that is fast bringing economic slavery in this 
country .... If the system of judicial law that is being written in defiance 
of state legislation and of congressional legislation is continued, ... there 
is no human power in America that can keep the Supreme Court from 
becoming a political issue, nationwide, in the not far-distant future.98 
Though the Senate ultimately confirmed Hughes 52-26, with eighteen senators 
abstaining, many senators believed their opposition had effectively signaled to 
President Hoover and the new chief justice both the extent of the senators' power 
and displeasure with the direction of the Court. 
By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt entered office, the hard-core opposition of 
the Court to economic reform had already begun to wither. By 1941, he had made 
four appointments, and there were no Republican appointees, with the sole 
exception of Harlan Fiske Stone, left on the Court. All of the nine justices, 
including Stone, shared a deep-seated hostility to economic due process and 
commitment to preserving the New Deal against constitutional attack. Some of the 
New Deal liberals whom Roosevelt appointed to the Court, particularly William 0. 
Douglas, were legal realists who were dedicated as judges to exposing the politics 
behind the formalisms of the Taft Court, to being enlightened by the social sciences, 
94 N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1930, in MASON, supra note 90, at 298. 
95 72 CONG. REC. 3553 ( 1930), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 298. 
96 MASON, supra note 90, at 299. 
97 72 CONG. REC. 3449, 3516, 3566 (1930), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra 
note 89, at 299. 
98 72 CONG. REC. 3642 ( 1930), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 299. 
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to being more candid about their reasoning, and ''to go[ing] with the unconscious 
flow of practice-based intuition.',99 
The Court's increasing acceptance of social legislation has dominated narratives 
on the Court during the period from 1930 to 1941. 100 The preoccupation with 
explaining both the significance and causes for this acceptance has sometimes come 
at the expense of recognizing the significance of at least two other developments 
that, together with the ultimate acceptance of the constitutional foundations for the 
New Deal, provided the fodder for public commentary on the Court during this 
period. The first of these was a series of decisions broadly interpreting the scope 
of various Bill of Rights claims that foreshadowed the Court's future agenda. 101 
This series of decisions became important because, in time, it helped to drive a 
wedge to divide the New Deal liberals, who increasingly disagreed over the 
appropriate level of judicial deference regarding non-economic interests. 
As this series of decisions unfolded, public discourse reflected the political 
divide over the Court. For example, The New York Times hailed the Court's 
decision in Powell v. Alabama102 as a healing decision in that it "ought to abate the 
rancor of extreme radicals while confirming the faith of the American people in the 
soundness of their institutions and especially the integrity of the courts. " 103 The far 
left disagreed, however, as the Communist Party position was that: "A careful 
reading of the official decision shows that the Supreme Court has taken great care 
to instruct the Alabama authorities how 'properly' to carry through such lynch 
schemes and bolster their discredited 'judicial' institutions.''104 
99 Thomas Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 501 (1996) 
(reviewing NEll..DUXBURY, PA ITERNSOF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ( 1996)). Grey provides 
a wonderful overview of the development of American legal thought in the twentieth 
century. For a more detailed and equally excellent overview, see LAURA KALMAN, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM ( 1991 ). 
100 Even before the Pa"ish case in 1937, it became clear that the laissez faire majority 
of the 1920s had become a minority. More often than not, Hughes and Roberts tended to be 
in the majority on questions regarding the constitutionality of social legislation. As Barry 
Cushman notes, "it is ... safe to say that by 1937 the prohibition against minimum wage 
legislation was pretty close to all that was left of economic substantive due process." Barry 
Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. &MARYL. REV. 95, 104 (1999). 
101 See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (holding freedom of assembly to 
be incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) 
(holding that due process requires states to supply indigent defendants with counsel); Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding freedom of the press to be incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
102 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
103 N. y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1932, at 8, in DANT. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OFTHE 
AMERICAN SOUTH 163 (1969). 
104 N.Y. DAILY WORKER, Nov. 8, 1932, at 8, in DANT. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A 
TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 163 ( 1969). 
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This debate was often overshadowed, however, by the residual vitriol of the 
conflict over economic substantive due process. A good example of the enmity 
marking this conflict was the extraordinary dissent of Justice McReynolds in The 
Gold Clause Cases. 105 Because the dissent was too scathing to be included in the 
official record, McReynolds published it in The Wall Street Journal. In his 
( characteristically) surly view: 
It is impossible to estimate the result of what has been done this day. The 
Constitution as many of us have understood it, the Constitution that has 
meant so much, has gone. The guarantees which men and women 
heretofore have supposed protected them against arbitrary action have been 
swept away. The powers of Congress have been enlarged to such an extent 
that no man can forsee their limitations. We stand today stripped of the 
fundamental guarantees we heretofore supposed stood between us and 
arbitrary action .... We protest .... Shame and humiliation are upon 
us.106 
President Roosevelt strongly expressed the opposing point of view in his Court-
packing speech. He stated: 
[S]ince the rise of the modem movement for social and economic progress 
through legislation, the Court has more and more often and more and more 
boldly asserted a power to veto laws passed by the Congress and State 
Legislatures . . . . The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but as 
a policy-making body .... We have, therefore, reached the point as a 
Nation where we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court 
and the Court from itself. 101 
Though Chief Justice Hughes's opposition to the Court-packing plan pleased 
many conservatives, his seemingly inconsistent jurisprudence persistently 
confounded conservatives and liberals alike. In a retrospective published near the 
time of his retirement, The New Republic commented that"[ o ]n questions involving 
social policy, it was always more difficult to predict where Hughes would stand 
105 The Gold Clause Cases were Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. 
United States, 294 U.S. 3 I 7 ( 1935); Nonnan v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 
240 (1935). 
106 WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1935, reprinted in ROBERT MAYER, 7THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN LIFE: THECOURTANDTHEAMERICANCRISES 1930-1952,at 127, 128-31 (1987). 
101 Radio Broadcast (Mar. 9, 1937), reprinted in DAVID M. O'BRIEN, 2 CONSTnurIONAL . 
LAW AND POLITICS 65-66 {4th ed. 2000). 
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than where other members of the Court would be found." 1O8 Even members of the 
Court noted the wandering path of the Court. In 1936, Justice Stone wrote to then-
Professor Felix Frankfurter: 
I think there has never been a time in the history of the Court when there 
has been so little intelligible, recognizable pattern in its judicial 
performance as in the last few years . . . . The worst of it is that the one 
[Hughes] you find most difficult to understand is the one chiefly 
responsible. 109 
Chief Justice Hughes dismissed such criticism on the ground that the jurisprudential 
labels on which it rested were misleading and ultimately inapplicable to him: 
A young student wrote me the other day to ask whether I regarded 
myself as "liberal" or"conservative." I answered that these labels do not 
interest me. I know of no accepted criterion .... Such characterizations 
.are not infrequently used to foster prejudices and they serve as a very 
poor substitute for intelligent criticism. A judge who does his work in 
an objective spirit, as a judge should, will address himself 
conscientiously to each case, and will not trouble himself about labels. 110 
By 1940, however, it was widely acknowledged that the debates on the Court 
regarding the legitimacy of business regulations had been settled and that a "new 
constitutionalism" had taken hold on the Court. Some commentators condemned 
this "new constitutionalism" on the ground that in settling the debates "[t]he Court 
has created doctrine, which stands in the way of its own lapse into legalism. " 111 
The second development glossed over in many commentaries on the Hughes 
Court relates to the status of conservative critics of the New Deal. Legal scholars 
focus so much on the development of New Deal liberalism that they often overlook 
what conservative politicians and commentators were arguing in the same period. 
Accounts of the revolution of 1937 usually gloss over conservatives, as if they were 
increasingly silent in this period. Yet conservatives could be heard not just on the 
IOS THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 9, 1941, in ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM 
TAFT TO WARREN l 05 ( 1958) [hereinafter MASON, THE SUPREME COURT]. 
109 Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 17, 1936), in MASON, THE 
SUPREME COURT, supra note 108, at 106. 
110 Address to the Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, 1932, in THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 300 (David J. Danelski & Joseph 
S. Tulchin eds., 1973). 
111 Walton Hamilton & George Brock, The Supreme Court Today, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
Aug. 5, 1940, in WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TwENTIETH 
CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY 1932-1968, at 112 (1970). 
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Court (for example, in Justice Sutherland's opinions), but also in strident public 
criticisms of New Deal legislation, 112 the apparent switch on the Hughes Court that 
brought about enduring support for New Deal legislation, 113 Roosevelt's Court 
appointments, 114 and of course Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. 115 The obvious 
problem for conservative leaders on the national stage was in wresting control of 
both the White House and the Congress from Democrats, but without threatening 
the dismantlement of relatively popular, even if somewhat ineffective, regulatory 
measures designed to ameliorate economic hardships produced in part by 
technological advancements. 116 The lack of political success left conservatives 
disgruntled and in some disarray. For conservatives, the 1930s were"[ u ]ncongenial 
years of worker's utopias, New Orders, and marching feet abroad; Blue Eagles, the 
WPA, and increasing regulation of the economy at home."117 
V. THE STONE AND VINSON COURTS, 1941-1953 
By the time President Roosevelt elevated Associate Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
to the chief justiceship in 1941, the Supreme Court and its agenda were very 
different from what they had been only a decade before. By 1941, the once-intense 
controversies over property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
112 For example, in a pamphlet dated May 31, 1935, the American Liberty League 
(founded by conservative businessmen) thundered: 
The New Deal is nothing more or less than an effort sponsored by inexperienced 
sentimentalists and demagogues to take away from the thrifty what the thrifty and 
their ancestors have accumulated, or may accumulate, and give it to others who 
have not earned it, or whose ancestors haven't earned it for them, and who never 
would have earned it and never will earn it, and thus indirectly to destroy the 
incentive for all future accumulation. Such a purpose is in defiance of all the tenets 
upon which our civilization has been founded. 
JOHNMAJOR, THENEWDEAL80(1967)(quotingRalphShaw, TheNewDeal: Its Unsound 
Theories and Irreconcilable Policies 13 (1935)). Indeed, opposition to Roosevelt became 
such a fixation of that traditional bastion of conservatism, the upper class, that HARPER'S 
magazine noted in May 1936 that "fanatical hatred of the President ... today obsesses 
thousands of men and women among the upper class." They Hate Roosevelt, HARPER'S, May 
1936, at 634, in MAJOR, supra, at 100. The author noted also that, "the phenomenon ... goes 
well beyond objection to policies or programs." Id. 
113 Id. at 176. 
114 See, e.g., WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 185-87 (1995) 
(discussing conservatives' reactions, inter alia, to Black's nomination in 1937). 
115 See id. at 85, 107, 135, 139, 158. 
116 See DAVID KENNEDY' FREEDOM FROM FEAR 278-86 ( 1999.). 
117 GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 
1945, at 1 (1996). 
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over the scope of enumerated federal powers had been fully settled. 118 Instead, the 
Court devoted significant attention to a number of troublesome constitutional issues 
brought about by the Second World War. 119 Moreover, it fragmented over the 
question of heightened scrutiny of measures affecting "specific" constitutional 
prohibitions, political processes, and insular minorities that the chief justice had 
initially raised as an associate justice in his fourth footnote in United States v. 
Carotene Products Co. 120 While to a substantial extent Stone's view had already 
prevailed, 121 the battle was not to be fully won until Felix Frankfurter retired from 
the Court in 1962.122 In the meantime, as David Currie has observed, "[a]s leading 
spokesmen for the competing views [on judicial restraint], Justices Black and 
Frankfurter, like Field and Miller three-quarters of a century before, squared off in 
1946 for another decade and a half of intense controversy over the most 
fundamental questions of judicial authority."123 
Neither Stone's replacement as chief justice in 1946 (Fred Vinson), nor any of 
Truman's other three appointees - Sherman Minton, Tom Clark, and Harold 
Bwton - played major roles in this debate. Unlike every other post-World War 
II president, Truman chose Supreme Court nominees based on his personal 
experiences with them and not on specific criteria designed to elicit information 
about their likely judicial philosophies.124 He appointed justices who were 
sympathetic to and supportive of the New Deal, but this was largely because he was 
choosing from a pool of politicians with whom he felt personally and ideologically 
comfortable. The pool obviously consisted of people who had largely gained their 
118 See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 669 (1941) (striking down 
bans on so-called "yellow-dog" contracts); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) 
(refusing to invalidate state statute on economic due process grounds); United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 ( 1941) (upholding federal minimum wage for production workers and 
explicitly overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)); NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I ( 193 7) ( defining federal power to regulate commerce). 
119 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding exclusion of 
Japanese Americans from coastal zones and, in effect, their internment); Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfews on Japanese Americans); Exparte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. I (1942) (upholdingjurisdictionofaspecial military tribunal over German 
saboteurs). 
120 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
121 See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319U.S. 624 (1943); Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
122 See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. 
123 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CoNSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND 
CENTURY 1888-1986, at 333 (1990) (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The history structure of this clash is extensively chronicled 
in JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA ( 1989). See also infra notes 125-55 and accompanying text. 
124 See SHELOON GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LoWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 68-78 (1997). 
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political experience and proven their loyalty to Truman in political contests over the 
New Deal and its legacy. 125 Consequently, Truman's appointees did not share any 
unified philosophy regarding the cutting constitutional issues of the day. They were 
widely regarded as "liberals" not so much because of a common judicial 
philosophy, but because of their shared political experiences prior to their 
appointments to the Court, including of course their support for Roosevelt's New 
Deal regime. 
Truman's appointments did not ease tensions within the Court, even though by 
1946 the Court consisted entirely of Democratic appointees. Fully aware of this 
discord during his chief justiceship, Stone wrote in 1945: 
My more conservative brethren in the old days enacted their own 
economic prejudice into law. What they did placed in jeopardy a great 
and useful institution of government. The pendulum has now swung to 
the other extreme, and history is repeating itself. The Court is now in as 
much danger of becoming a legislative and Constitution-making body, 
enacting into law its own predilections, as it was then. The only 
difference is that now the interpretations of statutes whether "over-
conservative" or "over-liberal" can be corrected by Congress. 126 
For the most part, Truman's appointees joined the more restrained of their senior 
colleagues to slow down the expansion of civil liberties after the departures of 
Stone and Roberts at the end of the Second World War and the premature deaths of 
Murphy and Rutledge. 127 Nevertheless, in this period the Court sanctioned the first 
ii, Id. 
126 Letter from C.J. Stone to Irving Brant (Aug. 25, 1945), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE 
STONE, supra note 89, at 779. Stone often confided in Brant, who was a prominent liberal 
commentator in the New Deal and post-New Deal eras. Brant shared many of these 
communications with Stone's eminent biographer, Alpheus T. Mason. According to Mason: 
Brant insist[ed] that [Stone] wished, above all, to be known as a 'liberal,' and his 
prerogative in assigning opinions, in speaking for the Court himself whenever he 
was with the majority, or passing the task along to [an] associate[], made this quite 
easy. In a perceptive article Brant tells how this self-portrait was executed. (See 
Irving Brant, "How Liberal Is Justice Hughes," The New Republic, July 21 and July 
28, 1937.) 
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 459-60 (footnote at bottom of page). 
127 Robert McCloskey notes: "Arithmetic reckonings alone illustrate the contrast. The 
proportion of decisions favorable to the individual never in any tenn of the Stone Court 
dropped below SO percent; there was only one term of the Vinson Court ( 194 7) in which the 
percentage of favorable decisions rose above fifty." ROBERTG. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN 
SUPREME COURT 57 (1972) (emphasis in original). 
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great wave of expansions in civil rights outside of the realm of economic due 
process, 128 and it advanced the process of incorporation.129 
Public criticism of the Court in the mid-l 940s focused on the increasing discord 
among the justices, the Court's disdain for following or respecting precedent, and 
the Court's penchant for making, rather than merely interpreting, the law. For 
instance, an editorial in The New York Times charged that the "majority of the new 
appointees came to the Court ... apparently under the theory that their function was 
not so much to know and apply the law as it stands, or in case of doubt to interpret 
it objectively, but to apply a new 'social philosophy' in their decisions."130 In 
reaction to the Underwriters' case,131 The New York Times commented in 1944, 
"[i]ts practical effect is the same as if Congress had just passed a sweeping new 
piece oflegislation. Once more the Supreme Court has acted, in effect, like a third 
legislative house."132 The Houston Post was even more critical. "When the United 
States Supreme Court doffs its black robes Monday," it reported in October 1944, 
"it will go with less popular admiration and respect than any previous Supreme 
Court has enjoyed within the memory of living men. In this body of jurists the 
majesty and dignity and the prestige of the nation's highest tribunal has hit an all-
time low."133 The American Bar Association condemned the Stone Court's 
tendency to ignore precedent, which it called "The New Guesspotism," and warned 
that the Constitution had again become "a mere thing of wax in the hands of the 
judiciary."134 Harvard Law School Professor Thomas Reed Powell asked: "Who 
can tell what other landmarks will be similarly obliterated? Where shall confidence 
be placed?"135 
128 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (outlawing white-only primaries); 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (outlawing exclusion of aliens 
from commercial fishing); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (setting limits on 
indirect governmental interference with First Amendment rights); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948) (outlawing judicial enforcement of racial covenants). 
129 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporating the 
right to a public trial); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the 
separation of church and state). 
130 MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 625 (citation omitted). 
131 United States v. Southeastern Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
132 MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 624 (citation omitted in original). 
133 Id. at 624 (citation omitted in original). 
134 30 A.B.A. J. 485 (Sept. 1944), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 
624; Frank W. Grinnell, 30 A.B.A. J. 507 (Sept. 1944), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, 
supra note 89, at 624; J.W. Henderson, 30 A.B.A. J. 597 (Nov. 1944), in MASON, HARLAN 
FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 624; C. Perry Patterson, Jefferson and Judicial Review, 30 
A.B.A. J. 443 (Aug. 1944), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 624. 
135 Thomas Reed Powell, Our High Court Analyses, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 18, 
1944, in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 624-25. 
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The Court, however, did have its defenders. For instance, prominent liberal 
commentator Walton Hamilton maintained the Court was dealing in good faith with 
difficult issues. He asked rhetorically why ''the Court, an organ of high policy in 
a society moving rapidly to a 'new social order,' [should not] reflect differences 
widespread among the people?"136 He further suggested that: 
If often its conduct has not been in accord with our angelic notions, .. 
. the reason is that the public is let in on the performance. I wonder if 
any other agency of state ... could under a like scrutiny exhibit either 
more brotherly restraint or a more conscientious regard for the general 
welfare. 137 
Looking back on the Stone Court's performance during the Second World War, 
Hamilton declared: 
Neither the law nor the Court is to be regimented so long as Stone sits ... 
. In less than a decade the Court has been transformed. It has ceased to be 
a super-legislature; it stands today, more firmly than any other agency of 
a State, in the great American tradition. 138 
Max Lerner, another prominent academic, agreed: "It is good to have Justices on 
the Supreme Court who pretend to no Olympian infallibility and who can stick their 
necks out of their enfolding robes."139 Legal scholar Kenneth Sears was even more 
praiseworthy of the Stone Court: "Never in the history of the Supreme Court of the 
United States has the Bill of Rights been more frequently or more ardently 
supported, and never have the privileges of the poor and the weak and of the 
minorities of race, color, and religion been more clearly asserted."140 
Chief Justice Stone was extremely sensitive to the public critiques, and he even 
agreed with some of them. 141 According to Stone's biographer Alpheus T. Mason, 
Stone believed this '"[l]iberalism' of the right sort would not lead judges to enact 
136 Walton Hamilton, The Supreme Court Today- Part I: Nine Independent Men, THE 
NATION, Aug. 12, 1944, in MASON, supra note 90, at 625; Walton Hamilton, Part II: Nine 
Men, One Law, THE NATION, Aug. 19, 1944, in MASON,HARIAN FISKE STONE, supra note 
89, at 625. 
137 MASON, HARIAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 798. 
13s Id. 
139 Id. (citation omitted). 
14° Kenneth C. Sears, The Supreme Court and the New Deal -An Answer to Texas, 12 
u. CHI. L. REV. 140, 159 (1945), in MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 798. 
141 See MASON, HARIAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 782-83 (quoting extensively 
Stone's approval of a leading scholar's critical analysis of the Court's work published in. 
1945). 
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their own economic preferences into law."142 Stone chided liberal critic Irving 
Brant: 
Back of your criticism of the 5 to 4 decisions ... is your recognition that 
Congress will not 'correct' them. It will not, because, as I believe, it never 
intended any other result than that which the Court reached. If that is so the 
Court has done its sworn duty. Are you seeking the appointment of judges 
who will do more?143 
In September 1945, Stone expressed to Thomas Reed Powell his concerns about the 
likely liberal activism of some of his colleagues: 
The time was when I thought you had worked yourself out of a job[,] ... 
because the pendulum had swung from the extreme right, where it seemed 
to be when I came on the Court, much nearer the golden mean. Now that 
the pendulum seems to be swinging to the other extreme, I feel sure you 
will have plenty to write about. 144 
Less than a year later, Stone's sudden death gave President Truman the 
opportunity to appoint his friend and political ally Fred Vinson as chief justice. 145 
The appointment of Vinson, however, did not lessen either the discord within the 
Court or its denunciations in political fora. A striking example is to be found in the 
consistently critical public statements of Senator James Eastland of Mississippi. In 
1946, he warned: 
[A] number of men who now sit upon the Court do not have the proper 
legal background, judicial temperament, or the ability to sit upon the 
world's greatest legal tribunal and to decide fundamental questions upon 
which the very system of our Government, as we know it, depends .... 
[S]ome students of government have expressed the opinion that these men 
were appointed because of their economic and social ideologies and their 
zest for crusading, rather than their judicial knowledge and legal acumen . 
. . . We find ourselves with a Court, which often is charged with being the 
142 Id. at 779. 
143 Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Irving Brant (Aug. 25, 1945), in MASON, HARl.AN 
FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 779. 
144 Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Thomas Reed Powell (Nov. 8, 1945), in MASON, 
HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 780 (citation omitted). 
145 Alpheus T. Mason closed his monumental biography of Stone on the same theme as 
many of the eulogies written at the time of Stone's death: "Little minds, trying to compress 
his meaning within the handy labels of 'conservative' or 'liberal,' had been confounded." 
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 809. . 
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weakest in the history of the Republic, a Court which now is engaged in 
changing the fundamental law of the United States and overruling the 
considered opinions of their great and illustrious predecessors .... The 
inferior courts and the people of this country do not know what the law is 
or what their rights are, because of the confusion created by the present 
Supreme Court. 146 
Public attacks on the Court often included charges of complicity with Communist 
subversion by the "liberal" justices and were peppered with thinly veiled racism. 
For example, Representative Rankin of Mississippi angrily suggested as much in 
his appraisal of the Vinson Court's decisions of the 1948 term: 
[T]here must have been a celebration in Moscow last night; for the 
Communists won their greatest victory in the Supreme Court of the 
United States on yesterday, when that once august body proceeded to 
destroy the value of property owned by tens of thousands of loyal 
Americans ... by their anti-covenants decision .... That tribunal [also] 
recently upheld the atheists ... [and] attempted, by judicial fiat, to 
redraw the boundary lines of every state .... Which all adds up to the 
fact that white Christian Americans seem to have no rights left which the 
present Supreme Court feels bound to respect. 147 
Similarly, Representative Mason of Illinois introduced into the Congressional 
Record an editorial from the Chicago Daily Tribune in July 1949 that lambasted the 
Vinson Court's decision in Christoffel v. United States. 148 The article stated that 
"[i]t was pretty evident in the Christoffel case that a left wing majority of the 
Supreme Court decided that it wanted to let Christoffel off, and having reached that 
decision, looked around for some law to make the decision look right."149 
In 1951, Justice Roberts, then retired from the Court, openly castigated the 
Vinson Court for: 
[S]urrender[ing] the role the Constitution was intended to confer on it. 
Vox populi vox Dei was not the theory on which the charter was drawn. 
The sharp divisions of powers intended has become blurred .... It seems 
obvious that doctrines announced as corollaries to express grants of 
power to the Congress have more and more circumscribed the pristine 
146 92 CONG. REC. 7,065 ( 1946) (statement of Sen. Eastland). 
147 94 CONG. REC. S,256-S7 (1948) (statement of Rep. Rankin). 
148 338 U.S. 84 (1949). 
149 95 CONG. REC. at A4693 (1949) (statement of Rep. Mason) (quoting Editorial, The 
Supreme Court Outsmarts Itself, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 18, 1949). 
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powers of the states, which were intended to be reserved to them by the 
Constitution. 150 
617 
Many liberals were not any more satisfied with the Vinson Court than its 
conservative critics. Some liberals, both on and off the Court, thought the Court 
was becoming too activist in its pursuit of liberal ideals. 151 Justice Frankfurter, in 
particular, found himself in an awkward position as the Court's chief advocate of 
judicial restraint. Praised by liberals for his staunch defense of judicial restraint in 
the 1930s and early 1940s, he was upset to find that, in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, they denounced him: 
Now, when he advocated judicial restraint, he was attacked by those 
very liberals [ who had once praised him.] In his earlier years, pillars of 
the legal community like Henry Stimson, Emory Buckner, and Charles 
Burlingham praised him. Now, they were either dead or silent. ... [I]n 
the Truman years, there was little White House contact. Frankfurter had 
never believed he was ''the single most influential man" in Washington 
but sometimes he had enjoyed the notoriety. Now there was no more 
notoriety; he was only one of nine, and one under increasing criticism 
from those once his friends. 152 
In 1951, Judge Learned Hand expressed his own dwindling confidence in the 
Vinson Court's ability to stay on the course that Chief Justice Stone had tried to 
steer: "[Stone] steered a course at times very difficult and he had the right -
absolutely right - measure of a Court's limitation on constitutional questions, 
which appears to be in danger of being lost again."153 
Others thought the Court was not going far enough. Looking back on the 
Vinson Court, Yale Law School Professor Fred Rodell harshly criticized its loyalty 
jurisprudence. 154 In his opinion, 
150 OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 95 ( 1951 }. 
151 A striking example of this phenomenon is Justice Frankfurter's characterization of 
Justice Hugo Black as "essentially lawless" in a letter to Learned Hand regarding denial of 
certiorari in United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d246(2dCir. 1951), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 
913 (1954), a case that had prompted an impassioned dissent from Hand while on the 
Second Circuit. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (Mar. 3, 1954); GUN11fER, 
supra note 47, at 623. 
152 LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 456 (1984). 
153 Letter from Learned Hand to Alpheus T. Mason (Aug. 22, 1951 ), in MASON, HARIAN 
FISKE STONE, supra note 89, at 777 (citation omitted). 
154 The loyalty cases arose in the 1950s in response to legislation passed to combat the 
perceived influence of subversives (read Communists) in many facets of American life. See, 
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[T]he tragedy ... is that the Supreme Court's majority, with the most 
magnificent opportunity ever granted so small a group to show the world 
the profound difference between the humanity of a democracy and the 
brutality of a dictatorship, so miserably failed; that the Court - except 
in the Negro cases - while purporting to fight a foreign tyranny, 
actually aped it. 155 
Similarly, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called for greater liberal judicial activism. In 
194 7, he wrote that"[ c ]onservative majorities in past Courts have always legislated 
in the interests of the business community .... " 156 So, Schlesinger wondered, 
"Why should a liberal majority tie its hands by a policy of self-denia1?"157 The 
Court's course after Chief Justice Vinson's death five years later in 1952 would 
provide a dramatic answer to this question. 
VI. THE WARREN COURT, 1953-1969 
The conventional wisdom in academia is that the Warren Court went through 
two phases of decision-making.158 The pivotal event that separates these periods 
was the retirement of Felix Frankfurter from the Court in 1962. President Kennedy 
appointed Arthur Goldberg to the seat vacated by Frankfurter, an appointment that 
transfonned an "activist minority" (then consisting of Black, Douglas, Warren, and 
Brennan)159 into a majority. Justice Frankfurter had been in the vanguard of the 
assault on racial injustice (notably Brown and its progeny)160 and religious 
establishment, 161 but he had lost a few important battles for "judicial restraint" in 
e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the Smith Act under which 
members of the Communist Party had been jailed for conspiring to organize a society to 
advocate violently overthrowing the U.S. government); Am. Communications Ass'n v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 ( 1950) (upholding legislation conditioning union access to the NLRB 
on loyalty oaths); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding the 
Hatch Act provisions limiting permissible political activity of civil service employees). 
155 FRED RODELL, NINE MEN 304 ( 1955). 
156 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 73. 
151 Id. 
158 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 123, at 375. 
1s9 Id. 
160 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); New Orleans City Park Improvement 
Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Gayle v. 
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor of 
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
161 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459-559 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
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other fields. 162 At the time of Frankfurter's retirement, the Warren Court had yet 
to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights, as it would over its remaining seven years, 
and through incorporation direct the widespread refonnation of state criminal 
procedures. 163 After Frankfurter's departure, 164 the Warren Court, building on 
precedents from the late 1930s and 1940s, expanded to unprecedented degrees the 
scope of equal protection, 165 free speech, 166 and criminal procedure guarantees. 167 
However one characterizes the Warren Court's evolution, 168 the political 
discontent it generated was intense. 169 The fact that the Court generated such 
discontent does not mean that it was running counter to prevailing social and 
162 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
163 For an overview of the development and application of the selective incorporation 
doctrine, see Jerold Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 Geo. L.J. 253 (1982). 
164 Another account of the Warren Court's activism focuses on its impact on process-
based jurisprudence, which posited, inter alia, that the rule of law was essential to the 
preservation ofliberal democracy. See Grey, supra note 99, at 504-05. The Warren Court's 
activism divided the: 
Id. 
[p ]rocess jurists .... Most of them followed Felix Frankfurter in rejecting liberal 
activism as simply the mirror image of the conservative activism of the old Court, 
equally partisan and no more consistent with the conception of a nonpolitical 
judiciary dedicated to upholding the rule of law. A minority of Process thinkers 
took up [Stone's] suggestion ... that the rule oflaw in a democracy required active 
judicial correction of the tendency of the majoritarian political system to 
undervalue the interests of minorities, dissenters, and the downtrodden. This 
division presaged a more far-reaching break-up: by the late 1960s, the remarkable 
sway that the Process Jurisprudence had held over postwar American legal thought 
was about to come to an end. 
165 See, e.g.,Harperv. Bd. ofElections,383 U.S. 663 (1966);Reynoldsv. Sims, 377U.S. 
533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
166 See, e.g., Tinkerv. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968); Streetv. New York, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
161 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963). 
168 For a description of the Warren Court in three phases, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE 
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN PoLmcs 122-23, 485-50 l (2000). 
169 For sympathetic accounts of the Warren Court, see, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998), POWE, supra note 169, LOUIS 
MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TuSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ( 1996), and J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a 
Democratic Society- Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. l ( 1968). For 
critical assessments of the Warren Court by prominent conservatives, see RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
( 1977), and PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 
(1970). 
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political mores. Instead, it likely means that over the Warren Court's lifespan, the 
opposition intensified, eventually culminating in the election of Richard M. Nixon 
to the presidency in 1968 and the launching of an era in which conservatives 
regained control of the Court. 170 
From the beginning, the Warren Court's activism on behalf of the equality and 
rights of minorities (particularly African Americans) and the poor provoked loud, 
bitter public protests.· Particularly in the South, state political and religious leaders 
called for Warren's "impeachment" and repeatedly resurrected the doctrine of 
interposition (made popular initially by John Calhoun in the nullification 
movement) as a check on its activism. 171 Governor George Talmadge of Georgia 
charged that the Supreme Court had "reduced our Constitution to a mere scrap of 
paper. It has blatantly ignored all law and precedent and usurped from the Congress 
and the people the power to amend the Constitution and from the Congress the 
authority to make the laws of the land."172 
Southern members of Congress were equally if not more critical. In the 
immediate wake of the Brown decision, Senator James Eastland of Mississippi 
issued a short statement of resistance that read: "[The South] will not abide by nor 
obey this legislative decision by a political court. We will take whatever steps are 
necessary to retain segregation in education."173 Even more dramatic was the 
statement of 101 members (nineteen senators and eighty-two representatives) of the 
Southern delegation in Congress known as the "Southern Manifesto."174 The 
Manifesto declared: 
170 JAMES PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES 1945-1974, at 677 
( 1996). Patterson suggested that the "[b ]acklash" to the liberal policies of the Great Society 
and activism of the Warren Court: 
Id. 
grew more ominous as the presidential election of 1968 approached. Many 
Americans ... especially resented liberals-permissive, patronizing, hypocritical, 
and sanctimonious do-gooders who reproved them for their resistance to the claims 
of minorities and assorted trouble-makers. (A conservative, it was said, was a 
liberal who had been mugged; a liberal was a conservative who hadn't been 
mugged-yet.) In an increasingly fragmented and polarized society, these angry 
people were a political force to be reckoned with. 
171 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 3, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1956) (interposing the sovereignty 
of Virginia against the Brown decision); see also SENATE OF VIRGINIA, COMMmEE FOR 
COURTS OF JUSTICE, THE DOCTRINE OF INTERPOSITION: ITS HISTORY AND APPLICATION, Reg. 
Sess. ( 1957) (presenting a detailed study of the doctrine of interposition and its applicability 
in the school desegregation context). 
172 NADINE COHODAS, STROM THURMOND AND THE POLITICS OF SOUTHERN CHANGE 254 
(1993) (citation omitted). 
in Id. 
174 See 102 CONG. REC.4515 ( I 956)(statement of Rep. Smith). 
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We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a 
clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal 
judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of 
Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the 
people. . . . [T]he Supreme Court of the United States, with no legal 
basis for such action, undertook to exercise their naked judicial power 
and substituted their personal political and social ideas for the 
established law of the land .... We decry the Supreme Court's 
encroachment on rights reserved to the States and to the people, contrary 
to established law and to the Constitution. We commend the motives of 
those States which have declared the intention to resist forced 
integration by any lawful means. 175 
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In Brown's immediate aftermath, the criticism of the Warren Court was hardly 
limited to the Southern political establishment. Shortly before his untimely death 
in 1954, Justice Robert Jackson penned a scathing indictment of the Court's activist 
majority. He charged, 
A cult of libertarian judicial activists now assails the Court . . . . This 
cult appears to believe that the Court can find in a 4,000-word 
eighteenth-century document or its nineteenth-century Amendments, or 
can plausibly supply, some clear bulwark against all dangers and evils 
that today beset us internally. This assumes that the Court will be the 
dominant factor in shaping the constitutional practice of the future and 
can and will maintain, not only equality with the elective branches, but 
a large measure of supremacy and control over them .... [This] seems 
to me a doctrine wholly incompatible with faith in democracy, and in so 
far as it encourages a belief that judges may be left to correct the result 
of public indifference to issues of liberty in choosing Presidents, 
Senators, and Representatives, it is a vicious teaching. I76 
Similarly, while delivering the Holmes Lectures at Harvard in 1958, Judge 
Learned Hand rebuked the Warren Court as a ''third legislative chamber."177 He 
argued: 
I cannot frame any definition that will explain when the Court will 
175 Id. at4515-16. 
176 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 57-58 (1955). 
177 LEARNED HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS 42 (1958). 
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assume the role of a third legislative chamber and when it will limit its 
authority to keeping Congress and the states within their accredited 
authority. Nevertheless, I am quite clear that it has not abdicated its 
former function, as to which I hope that it may be regarded as 
permissible for me to say that I have never been able to understand on 
what basis it does or can rest except as a coup de main. 178 
And, in 1960, Justice Frankfurter, in the course ofreminiscing on the Court's path 
during his career, pointedly singled out Thayer's 1893 article on judicial restraint 
as ''the great guide for judges and therefore, the great guide for understanding by 
non-judges of what the place of the judiciary is in relation to constitutional 
questions."179 
These liberal critics were just the tip of the iceberg- the Warren Court had not 
yet even entered the period during which it is commonly thought its true liberal 
activism flourished. A wave of bad publicity, including a denunciation by the 
American Bar Association Committee on Communist Strategy, engulfed the Court 
in the late l 950s. 180 Walter Murphy observed that at this time there was a "quiet but 
unmistakable undertone on Capitol Hill, a fear not only among conservatives but 
among moderates as well as some liberals that the justices had gone too far in 
protecting individ~al rights and in so doing had moved into the legislative 
domain."181 
As Lucas Powe recounts, the "summer of 1958 witnessed a battle over judicial 
power not quite comparable to Roosevelt's Court-packing plan twenty-one years 
earlier but close enough for Court supporters."182 During this period, conservatives 
responded to the Court's overruling of congressional attempts to restrict political 
dissent with accusations of Communist sympathies; 183 and James Eastland, by then 
an implacable foe of the Court, spearheaded one of several attempts to curb its 
jurisdiction.184 Indeed, bill after bill was added to the Eighty-Fifth Congress's 
burgeoning inventory of Court-curbing proposals. The suggested legislation 
included plans to give the Senate appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme Court, to 
allow Congress to reverse the Court's interpretation of the Constitution, to require 
a unanimous decision to invalidate a state law, and even one measure which would 
178 Id. at 55. 
179 FELIX FRANKFURTER, REMINISCES 347 (1960). 
180 See POWE, supra note 168, at 100. 
181 WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL PROCESS 116 ( 1962). 
182 See POWE, supra note 168, at 127. 
183 See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 2011 (1958) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[The] Warren 
Court has now thrown its protective cloak around fellow travelers and Communists. The 
Court is simply blind to the reality of our time."). 
184 See POWE, supra note 168, at 128. 
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have ordered lower courts to disregard any Supreme Court decision ''which 
conflicts with the legal principle of adhering to prior decisions and which is clearly 
based upon considerations other than legal. "185 These measures barely failed. As 
Robert Mccloskey observed, "[t]he 1958 counter-attack on the Court, even though 
it failed, can still be regarded as a firebell in the night; it did come shockingly close 
to succeeding."186 
The attacks on the Warren Court persisted for more than a decade, though the 
political climate in which it rendeted its decisions became somewhat more 
hospitable in the mid-1960s. 187 For instance, in 1958, state chief justices formally 
issued a report that condemned the Warren Court's "activism" for expanding federal 
powers at the expense of the states. 188 In that same year, there were press reports 
that many justices lacked competence and that, according to former Jackson law 
clerk William Rehnquist, the Court's law clerks showed "extreme solicitude for 
claims of Communists and other criminal defendants [and] expansion of federal 
power at the expense of state power. "189 In 1962, the Council on State Governments 
formally declared its support for amendments that would permit state legislatures 
to amend the Constitution without consideration or discussion in any federal forum, 
that would make apportionment in the state legislatures immune to federal judicial 
review, and that would create a special court consisting of the chief justices of all 
fifty states empowered to overrule Supreme Court decisions involving federal-state 
relations. 190 
In that same year, liberal newspapers heaped praise on the Warren Court's 
decision striking down school prayer, 191 while conservative papers such as The Wall 
Street Journal condemned the decision for "violent wrecking of the Constitution's 
language" and for being "symptomatic of a broader move in the nation toward the 
rigid exclusion of all traces of religion in the public schools."192 Also, in 1962, 
many national and state political leaders excoriated Baker v. Ca", 193 including 
Senator Richard Russell who denounced the case as "another major assault on our 
185 MURPHY, supra note 181, at 116 (footnote and citation omitted). 
186 Robert G. McCloskey, Reflections on the Wa"en Court, 51 VA. L. REv. 1229, 1258 
(1965), in POWE, supra note 168, at 134. 
187 POWE, supra note 168, at 214. 
188 Report of the Committee on Federal-State Relations as Affected by Judicial Decisions 
27-29 (1958), in POWE, supra note 168, at 139. 
,
189 Who WritesDecisionsoftheSupremeCourt?, U.S.NEWS&WORLDREPORT,Dec.13, 
1957, at 74, in POWE, supra note 168, at 139 (the story on law clerks provoked one senator 
to call for an investigation of the Court's law clerks). 
190 See MASON, supra note 108, at 243. 
191 Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
192 WALL ST. J., June 27, 1962, at 14, in POWE, supra note 168, at 187-88. Religious 
organizations and leaders also split on Engle. See POWE, supra note 168, at 188. 
193 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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constitutional system."194 In 1964, the Republican presidential candidate Barry 
Goldwater declared that of all three branches, ''today's Supreme Court is the least 
faithful to the constitutional tradition of limited government, and to the principle of 
legitimacy in the exercise of power. " 195 The Republican platform in 1964 called for 
a constitutional amendment to overturn the application of the Court's one person, 
one vote rule to both chambers. 196 The Escobedo decision, 197 issued in the same 
year, raised, in historian John Morton Blum's estimation, ''the storm against the 
Court to gale force."198 Goldwater attacked the Court in the aftermath of Escobedo 
for "contributing to the breakdown of law and order in the cities."199 Two years 
later, the Warren Court's Miranda decision, according to Yale Kamisar, 
"galvanized opposition to the Warren Court into a potent political force,"200 
including Congress's passage oflegislation to curb its effects.201 
As the decade was .winding down, Abe Fortas's controversial nomination as 
chief justice generated a heated confirmation battle, which featured vitriolic 
opposition from many Southern senators against the Warren Court's "liberal 
activism" and even a thirty-minute film featuring stills from movies Fortas had held 
protected by the First Amendment. 202 At the time ofFortas 's confirmation hearings, 
polls showed the vast majority of Americans holding the Supreme Court in low 
194 N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1962, at 1, in POWE, supra note 168, at 203-04. 
195 22 CONG. Q. 2534 (1964), in POWE, supra note 168, at 238. 
196 See id. at 252. 
197 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
198 JOHN MORTON BWM, YEARS OF DISCORD 210 (1991). 
199 PAULL. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 381 (1972), in POWE, supra 
note 168, at 391-92. 
200 POWE, supra note 168, at 399 (quoting Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal 
Justice, in THE WARREN COURT 139 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996)). 
201 The legislation passed by Congress was ultimately codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3501, 
which purported to make any confession "admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." 
18U.S.C. § 3501(a). InDickersonv. UnitedStates,530U.S.428(2000), the Supreme Court 
struck down this statute on separation of powers grounds. In an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the Court declared that "Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, 
may not in effect be overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to ovenule Miranda 
ourselves." Id. at 432. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that: 
Given § 350l's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of 
admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial 
courts to consider a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of 
a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its 
enactment to overrule Miranda. 
Id. at 436. 
202 See POWE, supra note 168, at 47~-72. 
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regard.203 
To forestall any further liberal judicial activism, conservatives would have to 
do more than join in or even lead criticizing the Court; they would have to win the 
presidency and alter the membership of the Court. Their chance would come in the 
form of Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon, who made clear that he 
was "running against Warren and his Court as much as he was running against his 
Democratic rival, Senator Hubert Humphrey."204 Nixon's victory was due in no 
small measure to the opposition to the Warren Court. As George Nash noted, 
[I]n a curious way, the Supreme Court did come to exert a significant 
influence on the postwar conservative intellectual movement. ... By 
forcing to the surface in the most dramatic cases some of the most 
profound questions about the nature of American life and the entire 
political process, by making issues of such supreme gravity public and 
debatable, the Warren Court helped polari7.e the Left and Right. And 
polarization is the first step toward self-definition.205 
Once back in power, Republican leaders asserted very different constitutional 
visions to those that had dominated and moved the Warren Court over the preceding 
sixteen years. As conservatives sharpened their constitutional philosophy, liberals 
would increasingly fragment over their attitudes about the Warren Court. 
VII. THE BURGER COURT, 1969-1986 
When Richard Nixon found himself with four vacancies on the Supreme Court 
to fill in his first three years as president, there were both hopes and fears of a 
revolution in American constitutional law. As a candidate and as president, Nixon 
repeatedly promised to appoint: 
"[S]trict constructionists" who would see ''their duty as interpreting law 
and not making law"; who would follow a ''properly conservative" course 
of judging that would, in particular, protect society's ''peace forces" against 
the "criminal forces"; and who would "see themselves as caretakers of the 
Constitution and servants of the people, not superlegislators with a free 
hand to impose their social and political viewpoints upon the American 
203 Id. at 473. 
204 ROBERT WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN IO (1979) (citation 
omitted in original). 
205 GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELI..ECTUALMOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 
1945, at 199 (2d ed. 1996). 
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People."206 
President Nixon did not elaborate on these "criteria." In time, Nixon would succeed 
in appointing four justices, whose common link their opposition to the liberal 
activism of the Warren Court rather than a commitment to a specific, alternative 
ideology. 
By 1986, seven of the Court's justices had been appointed by Republican 
presidents who had campaigned against and were openly critical of the Warren 
Court's activism.207 In the last four years of the Burger Court, only two of the nine 
justices had been appointed by Democratic presidents (though Republican 
presidents had appointed Democrats William Brennan and Lewis Powell). 
Yet these Republican appointees did not produce the expected results. Instead, 
the big story of the Burger years was the counter-revolution that did not occur. 
Scholars have given different explanations and characterizations of what transpired 
during the seventeen-year course of the Burger Court. David Currie suggests, 
The most notable decisions of the Burger Court were those that appeared 
to extend the work of the Warren period, not to restrict it. It was the Burger 
Court, not its predecessor, that first protected abortion and commercial 
speech and legitimated busing and affinnative action; that first curbed sex 
discrimination, political patronage, and aid to parochial schools; that even 
called a temporary end to capital punishment.208 
In some instances, the Burger Court did, however, pull back from the 
implications of some of its initial decisions. 209 In addition, almost from the first, the 
new justices demonstrated a tendency to nibble away one case at a time at the 
edifice of criminal procedure that the Warren Court had erected,210 while a series 
206 ABRAHAM,supra note 18, at 298-99 ( quoting Campaign Speech (Nov. 2, 1968), in 21 
·' CONG. Q., WEEKLY REPORT, May 23, 1969, at 798). 
201 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 251-89. 
208 CURRIE,supra note 123, at464 (emphasis added). The cases that correspond with the 
issues Currie identifies as first addressed by the Burger Court are: Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 
507 (l 980)(political patronage); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
(affinnative action); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (political patronage); Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (commercial speech); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
( abortion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 ( 1972) ( death penalty); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71 (1971) (sex discrimination); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (parochial 
schools); and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 ( 1971) (busing). 
209 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to extend the Court's 
substantive due process arguments of Roe to homosexuality); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invalidating an affirmative action program). 
210 Two lines of cases chipped away at the twin pillars of the Warren Court's criminal 
procedure edifice. The first, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (prohibiting the use of 
I 
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of decisions upholding the constitutionality of plea bargaining suggested that it 
hardly mattered what procedures were required in the uncommon event of a trial. 211 
Only a partial explanation for the Burger Court's failure to reverse the Warren 
Court's revolution lies in the fact that it was not until 1975 that the new Republican 
justices constituted a working majority. Equally important is the fact that at least 
three of them (Black:mun, Stevens, and Powell) did not perform with quite as much 
fidelity to judicial restraint as originally expected.212 The most dramatic 
illegally obtained evidence in criminal trials), was significantly weakened by United States 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), Rakas v. 
lllinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), United States v. 
Havens, 446U.S. 620 (1980), United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), andINSv. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 ( 1984). In the second, the Miranda decision suffered a similar fate, 
as it was weakened in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433 (1974), North Carolina v. Butler,441 U.S. 369 (1919),Rhodelslandv. Innis,446 
U.S. 291 (1980), California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), New York v. Quarles, 461 
U.S. 649 (1984), and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
211 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 ( 1978); Santobello v. New Yorlc, 404 U.S. 
257 (1971); Bradyv. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
212 None of the three thought of himself, at least at the beginning of his tenure, as a 
judicial activist President Nixon introduced Powell to the nation as a "strict constructionist," 
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 349 (1994) (citation omitted in 
original). Though Powell avoided using the same phrase in describing his judicial 
philosophy, he told the Senate Judiciary Committee in his confirmation hearings, "I believe 
in the importance of judicial restraint, especially at the Supreme Court level. ... In deciding 
each case, the judge must make a conscious and determined effort to put aside his own 
political and economic views and his own predilections and to the extent possible to put 
aside whatever subtle influences may exist from his own background and experience." Id. 
at 349 ( citation omitted in original). At his confirmation hearings in 1970, Harry Blackmun 
endorsed an even more restrictive judicial ideology: "I personally feel that the Constitution 
is a document of specified words and construction. I would do my best not to have my 
decision affected by my personal ideals and philosophy, but would attempt to construe that 
document in the light of what I feel is its definite and determined meaning." Id. Similarly, 
in a letter responding to a series of written questions regarding his jurisprudential 
philosophy, Justice Stevens wrote: 
I [would not] feel free to construe the broad phrases of the Constitution on the 
basis of my own personal philosophy .... It is never appropriate for a judge 
interpreting the Constitution ... to disregard the intent of its authors to the extent 
that such intent can be fairly ascertained .... The fact that a Justice of the Supreme 
Court feels that a particular constitutional provision is not adequate to deal with 
today's social conditions is not a sufficient basis for placing a construction on that 
document which is not warranted by its language or by the course of decisions 
interpreting it. 
Letter from John Paul Stevens to Sen. James Eastland (Dec. 8, 1975), reprinted in 
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transformation involved Justice Blackmun.213 
Such a transformation would not be lost on the next Republican president, 
Ronald Reagan, who made as a centerpiece of his agenda the appointment of judges 
committed to "strict construction of the Constitution rather than a liberal agenda 
based on a concept of judicial activism."214 His administration wasted no time in 
developing a careful screening process to verify whether prospective nominees had 
the appropriate ideology for appointment,m culminating in the appointments as 
federal appellate judges several prominent conservative academics - most notably 
Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, Richard Posner, Ralph Winter, Frank Easterbrook, 
Douglas Ginsburg, and J. Harvie Wilkinson - who helped to demonstrate on the 
bench and explain in other fora their conceptions of appropriate judicial restraint. 216 
Many of these appointees explained that their commitment to judicial restraint was 
made possible by hewing closely to original understanding; thus, originalism 
became closely associated with the most prominent conservative judges of the 
era.211 
Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearing on 
Nomination of John Paul Stevens of Illinois, to be an Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court Before The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 8 ( 1975). In his 
oral testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Stevens also stated: "One 
should always subordinate his own personal views, whether they be economic, social, 
political ... because when you are talking about your own views you are only one of 
millions of individuals in the country." Id. at 44. 
213 See DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGtrr: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST COURT 233-34 
(1992): 
Id. 
After the Roe opinion, Blackmun appeared to undergo one of the great 
transformations in Supreme Court history. In 1970, Nixon had selected him as 
a midwestern Republican with a law-and-order reputation .... By the mid-
1970s, however, Blackmun had broken with Burger and aligned himself with the 
Court's liberals ... [One possible explanation] is that Nixon and the press had 
typecast him incorrectly in the first place .... Blackmun was never a Nixon 
Republican and had little allegiance to the conservative dogma. 
214 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 281. 
215 See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGKT AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
TuRNINO BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 222-49 ( 1990). 
216 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 802 (l 982);RichardA. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. 
CT. REV. 49 (1981); Antonin Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism and the Legal Order, 9 HARV. 
J.L. & Pue. POL'Y 123 (1986). 
217 See Earl M. Maltz, Brown v. Board of Education and "Originalism," in GREAT 
CASES, supra note 45, at 136, 141-42: 
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One common perspective of the Burger Court is that on core constitutional 
issues the justices who served on the Burger Court divided on the basis of their 
political ideology. In his excellent book on the chief justiceship of Warren Burger, 
the distinguished conservative constitutional scholar Earl Maltz takes issue with this 
viewpoint and argues instead that it "can plausibly be seen as having produced the 
most liberal jurisprudence in history- even more liberal than that generated by its 
predecessor."218 In Maltz's view, 
[T]he Burger Court advanced well beyond Warren Court jurisprudence on 
a variety of issues identified with liberal politics. Further, while cutting 
back at the margins, the Burger Court refused to overrule the core 
principles underlying Warren Court jurisprudence dealing with issues such 
as reapportionment and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. However, given 
the makeup of the Court, what is perhaps most surprising is that its activism 
was almost entirely liberal-oriented; although there were a few notable 
exceptions, decisions invoking conservative values to strike down liberal 
initiatives from other branches of government were extremely rare during 
the Burger era.219 
In their respective appraisals of the Burger Court, Vince Blasi and Bernard 
Schwartz concluded, however, that the Burger Court's jurisprudence lacked any 
discernible focus - that it should be characterized as "rootless activism"220 or 
simply "pragmatic."221 Maltz agrees, to some extent, with these appraisals. He 
recognizes that: "[T]he Court was composed of nine independent contractors with 
widely differing political and jurisprudential agendas. Thus, it should not be 
surprising that the pattern of decisions emerging from the Court reflected the 
shifting coalitions among these independent contractors rather than a single, easily 
Id. 
[T]he debate over originalist methodology divided the country along political 
lines. Many conservatives attacked not only the substantive conclusions of post-
Brown jurisprudence, but also the legitimacy of judicial activism that was not 
founded on the original understanding. Liberals . . . increasingly saw an 
unconstrained Court as a reliable political ally; thus, originalism became 
anathema in liberal ideology. 
218 EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 1969-1986, at I 
(2000). 
219 Id. at 1-2. 
220 Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT: 
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 198 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). 
221 BERNARDSCHWARTZ, THEASCENTOFPRAGMATISM: THEBURGERCOURTINACTION 
(1990) .. 
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described intellectual theme."222 Refusing to rest on this conclusion, Maltz asserts 
that, 
[T]o concede that the patterns of decision making are not easily described 
does not imply that the patterns are nonexistent; instead, it simply suggests 
that the decisions are the product of the patterns of decision making of each 
of the individual justices, patterns which themselves reflect varying 
combinations of purely political and distinctively legal considerations. 223 
Yet, as one moves away from the academic commentary on the Burger Court, 
one quickly discovers the increasingly intensifying social and political divisions 
generated by the Burger Court's decisions, including abortion rights cases. 224 
Though the controversy over the abortion rights cases presented a rare opportunity 
for the public debate over the direction of the courts to address the implications of 
technology (in the form of certain medical procedures), Roe and its progeny were 
viewed more as a symptom of the problem with the Court than the problem itself. 
The problem was the Court's failure to respect federalism, and its solution was, as 
characterized by President Reagan's Attorney General Edwin Meese, adherence to 
a "Jurisprudence of Original Intention."225 With Roe, free speech, freedom of 
religion, and other precedents expanding rather than overruling Warren Court 
precedents in mind, Meese explained, 
[I]t is our belief that constitutional law should be rooted in principles that 
are derived from the text and original intention of the Constitution ... [and 
that s]uch disputes are properly resolved within the several states at the 
level of civil or legal rights, as a matter of statutory law; not at the national 
level as a matter of constitutional right.226 
This line of commentary provoked much criticism from liberals on the Court and 
222 MALTZ, supra note 218, at 5. 
223 Id. (footnote omitted). 
224 One of the most significant developments, which was beyond the scope of Maltz's 
study, was the increasing fragmentation of liberals over the most "activist" of the Warren 
and Burger Court precedents, including but not limited to Roe. For an account of the 
splintering of liberals into, inter alia, the feminist, critical legal studies, and Critical Race 
Theory movements, see Grey, supra note 100, at 505-07. 
225 Address to the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted in MAIORPOUCY 
STATEMENTS OF THE A ITORNEY GENERAL: EDWIN MEESE III 1985-88, at 7. 
226 Address to the American Enterprise Institute (Aug. 6, 1985), reprinted in MAJOR 
POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE A TIORNEY GENERAL: EDWIN MEESE ill 1985-88, at 12; see 
also Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, Commencement Address at Tulane 
University (Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in id. at 45-51. 
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in Congress. Leading the charge, Justice William Brennan called Meese' s approach 
"facile historicism" that "in truth is little more than arrogance cloaked as 
humility."227 Later the same month, Justice Stevens suggested that the argument for 
reliance on original intention "is somewhat incomplete [because] it overlooks the 
importance of subsequent events in the development of our law. "228 Senator Joseph 
Biden accused Meese of holding "extreme and unacceptable views" and attempting 
''to rewrite in his own image our most basic law. "229 
Moreover, the Burger Court repeatedly found itself the target of jurisdiction-
stripping measures proposed in retaliation against the Court's desegregation, 
freedom of religion, and abortion decisions.230 In addition, it became routine for 
members of Congress to propose amendments to overturn Roe and other "liberal" 
precedents of the Burger Court;231 and some members of Congress even proposed 
to do away with life tenure in response to the Burger Court's activism.232 
These congressional attempts came to naught. Nor did any of these efforts have 
any apparent effect on the Court's path. Inst~ad, change in the Court's functioning 
came, as it has often come in the past, from new appointments to the Court. 
vm. THE REHNQUIST COURT, 1986- THE PRESENT 
Except for one very intense year early during Warren Burger's tenure as chief 
justice, 233 there were no fierce Supreme Court confirmation contests, in spite of the 
m Stuart Taylor, Jr., Brennan Opposes Legal View Urged By Administration, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1985, at 1. The liberal attacks on the use of original intent were not limited 
to the Court. Biden Says Meese is Trying to Reshape U.S. Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
7, 1985, at A20. 
228 Stuart Taylor, Jr.,Justice Stevens, In Rare Criticism, Disputes Meese on Constitution, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1985, at 1. 
229 Biden Says Meese is Trying to Reshape U.S. Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1985, 
at A20. Senator Biden also stated: "The Attorney General's real position is little-disguised 
social activism of the Right." Id. 
230 See, e.g., Student Moratorium Transportation Act of 1972, S. 3388, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess.; H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (desegregation); Equal Educational Opportunities 
Act of 1972, S. 3395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (desegregation); 
H.R. 326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (school prayer); H.R. 865, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1981) (school prayer); H.R. 867, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (abortion). 
231 See, e.g., H.R. 261, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.J. Res. 119, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973); H.R.J. Res. 426, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
232 See, e.g., H.RJ. Res. 33, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 69, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 120, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 199, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 669, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.J. Res. 869, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1973). 
233 In November 1969, the Senate rejected President Nixon's nomination of Clement 
Haynsworth to replace Abe Fortas as an associate justice on the Supreme Court. Less than 
six months later, the Senate rejected Nixon's next nominee, Harold Carswell, to fill the 
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sharp criticisms of so many of the Court's decisions, most notoriously Roe. 
Burger's resignation announcement coincided, however, with the dawn of a 
different era; and the Rehnquist Court itself would not be able to begin formally 
without the most contentious confirmation proceeding for a chief justice since 
Hughes's confirmation in 1930. 
The opposition to Rehnquist's nomination as chief justice quickly targeted his 
judicial ideology. 234 His record in individual rights cases as an associate justice was 
not only well known but, in the views of liberal Senate opponents, "out of the 
mainstream."235 Rehnquist largely dodged questions about how he would rule in 
future cases on the grounds that they impinged on judicial independence. 
Nevertheless, the Republican-controlled Senate confirmed Rehnquist 65-33. The 
thirty-three votes cast against his nomination constituted the largest number of votes 
ever cast against a successful nominee for the chief justiceship. 
It was just the beginning of the storm, for later in 1986 the Democrats regained 
control of the Senate. Hence, they were in the majority when Lewis Powell 
announced his intention to resign from the Court in 1987. The significance of 
President Reagan's naming Powell's successor was not lost on anyone, for Powell 
had been, as The New York Times reported at the time of the announcement of his 
resignation, ''the determined moderate [who had cast the] critical fifth votes in key 
Supreme Court rulings. [Thus, h]is resignation gave President Reagan a historic 
opportunity to shape the future of the court. "236 President Reagan's choice of 
Robert Bork to replace Powell promised, however, to be contentious not only 
because Powell had been the swing vote in so many important cases, but also 
because Bork had been among the most outspoken critics of the Warren and Burger 
Courts' decisions expanding the scope of the Bill of Rights' guarantees.237 
vacancy arising from Fortas's resignation from the Court. Neither rejection had a lot to do 
with the ideology of the nominee. The Democratically-led Senate rejected Haynsworth in 
part as payback for F ortas being driven off the Court because of his ethical lapses as a sitting 
Justice. The opposition to Haynsworth claimed be had committed ethical breaches no less 
serious than those made by Fortas. Subsequently, the Senate rejected Carswell based on 
serious questions about his competence to serve on the Court. See generally DAVID Y ALOF, 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT 
NOMINEES 104-12 (1999) (discussing the problems leading to the Senate's rejections of 
President Nixon's nominations of Clement Haynsworth in 1969 and Harold Carswell in 
1970). 
234 Rehnquist also confronted charges that as a law clerk for Justice Jackson in 1953 he 
had urged Jackson to support the constitutionality of segregated schools and in the 1960s he 
had harassed minority workers at polling places. O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 71. 
235 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 292 (citation omitted in original). 
236 Id. at 297. 
237 See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986); Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, The Francis 
Boyer Lectures on Public Policy (American Enterprise Institute, Dec. 1984); Neutral 
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Bork's confirmation hearings were among the most contentious ever. Like 
Brandeis, Bork faced charges that he was a "radical. "238 The more Bork tried to 
portray himself as a moderate who had "great respect for precedent, "239 the more he 
opened himself to charges of a "confirmation conversion"240 due to his harshly-
worded critiques of the "liberal" precedents of the Warren and Burger Courts and 
his declarations that "in the field of constitutional law, precedent is not all that 
important. "241 The subsequent testimony of over one hundred witnesses on the 
nomination's merits and on differing approaches to constitutional interpretation 
represented, in Senator Joseph Biden's judgment, "a referendum on the past 
progress of the Supreme Court and a referendum on the future. "242 In the end, the 
interest groups and politicians who had become invested in the very precedents 
Bork had so long attacked forged successful opposition to his nomination. He 
became the first Supreme Court nominee to be rejected on the basis of ideology 
since John Parker. While Parker had been rejected largely because of controversy 
over the scope of the federal government's power to regulate the·economy,243 Bork 
had been rejected largely because of his hostility to many of the Warren and Burger 
Courts' most prominent individual rights decisions, especially those expanding 
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees and protecting aspects of 
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut244 and Roe. 
Shortly after his rejection, Bork published a scathing attack on the liberal 
interest groups, intellectuals, and politicians who organized his defeat. 245 He 
defended the originalist philosophy he had advanced as an academic, circuit judge, 
and Supreme Court nominee. He explained that his confirmation hearings: 
merely brought [trends toward censoring or punishing conservative 
thought] into the open in a way that had never previously occurred but was 
bound to happen sooner or later as conservative presidents, armed with the 
nomination power, begin to threaten the liberal hegemony over the courts. 
[My] book has traced the increasingly political nature of the Supreme 
Court, which reached its zenith with the Warren Court, and the increasing, 
by now almost overwhelming, politicization of the law schools, where 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
238 O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 74 (citation omitted in original). 
239 Id. at 75 (citation omitted in original). 
240 Id. at 75 (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy) (citation omitted in original). 
241 Id. (citation omitted in original). 
242 Id. at 76 (quoting Sen. Joseph Biden) (citation omitted in original). 
243 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
244 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
245 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW (1990). 
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much constitutional scholarship is now only politics.246 
Bork castigated liberal academics for helping to orchestrate his defeat. In his view, 
"I had criticized the Warren Court, and [the ideological attack on my nomination] 
was the revenge of the Warren Court. "247 The book confirmed his opponents' worst 
fears about his disdain for the individual rights precedents most commonly 
associated with the liberalism of the Warren and Burger Courts.248 
The next extensive battle over a Supreme Court nomination came four years 
later with President George Bush's nomination of Clarence Thomas to replace 
Thurgood Marshall. Like Reagan, Bush had campaigned as the nominee of a party 
that had explicitly called for the overruling of Roe and pledged to appoint "a strict 
constructionist, a judicial restraintist, [someone who was] dedicated to legal and 
constitutional precedent and history. "249 His nomination was complicated by 
several extenuating circumstances: He had a record of controversial writings and 
speeches that assailed some of the Warren and Burger Courts' best-known decisions 
expanding individual rights; the person he was replacing- Thurgood Marshall-
was a living liberal legend; and President Bush had raised expectations regarding 
his credentials by promising that he was the "best person at the right time" to 
replace the retiring Justice Marshall.250 If that was not enough, a former assistant 
had accused him of sexual harassment in the midst of his confirmation hearings.251 
Thomas weathered the storm in part because, on substantive constitutional 
questions, he gave evasive answers, made no promises of how he would perform as· 
a justice, and on the harassment charges, he put his opposition on the defensive by 
accusing it of racist motives. His eventual confirmation by the closest vote in favor 
of any Supreme Court nominee in the twentieth century was not interpreted at the 
time as a victory for any particular constitutional philosophy or as sending any kind 
of clear signal on the Senate's preferences regarding the Court's composition or 
direction. 
With its current composition of seven justices appointed by Republican 
presidents dedicated to the overrulings of many Warren and Burger Court 
precedents and only two by Democratic President Bill Clinton, the Rehnquist Court 
246 Id. at 348. 
247 Id. at 349. 
248 In his book, Bork targeted many of the nation's leading liberal constitutional theorists. 
More than a few responded. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 
99 YALEL.J. 1419 (1990); RonaldM. Dworkin,Bork'sJurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
657 (1990); see also Suzanna Sherry, Original Sin, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1215 (1990). 
249 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 305 (paraphrasing Bush's pledges). 
250 Id. at 310 (citation omitted in original). 
251 For an overview of the contest over Thomas's nomination, see JANE MAYER & JILL 
ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS ( 1994). 
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is still a work in progress.252 Over the course ofits fifteen years (and counting), the 
Rehnquist Court has been described as "conservative,"253 "liberal,"254 "activist,"255 
the model of restraint, 256 "arrogant,"257 "betraying" the cause of conservatism, 258 and 
"imperialist. "259 Such disparate reactions reflect, inter alia, the fact that the Court's 
252 At present, the last vacancy to arise on the Court was seven years ago, the longest 
period of time in which the Court has gone without a vacancy since the first half of the 
nineteenth century. 
253 See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, A Conservative Court? Yes, 1993 PUB. INT. L. 
REV. 12 7 ( 1993) ("The Rehnquist Court truly is a conservative Court. It is so much of one, 
in fact, that the disagreements on the Court and about the Court are now entirely debates 
within conservatism, not between liberalism and conservatism."). 
254 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Again, A Struggle for the Soul of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 8, 1992, at Al9 (responding to the Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 ( 1992), and asserting that the Court seems "given more to liberal activism than 
to adherence to the principles of the Constitution as originally understood"). 
255 See, e.g., Edward Walsh, An Activist Court Mixes Its High-Profile Messages, WASH. 
POST, July 2, 2000, at A6 (quoting national legal director of the ACLU Robert Shapiro as 
stating: "It is still a conservative court that has also become one of the most activist courts 
in American history."). 
256 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, A LOOK AT . .. The Rehnquist Court; They Want to Be 
Known as Jurists, Not Activists, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at B3 (calling the Rehnquist 
Court "more restrained and legalistic" than its liberal activist predecessor). 
257 See, e.g., RenataAdler,/"eparableHarm, THENEWREPUBLIC,July30, ~001 (stating 
that the Court's "moral, intellectual, and legal authority had already diminished over a long 
period of poorly reasoned opinions expressed in unseemly and unjudicial - often 
supercilious and even sneering - words"); Carl T. Rowan, At Least Duke Isn't a Closet 
Bigot Like Some, Hous. CHRON.,Apr. 3, 1999, atA32 (assertingthat"ChiefJustice William 
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia are 'arrogant' in their approaches to race"). 
258 Immediately after the Rehnquist Court's surprising 5-4 re-affl.IlDation of Roe in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), conservative 
leaders charged Justices O'Connor, Souter, and especially Kennedy (who had been 
confirmed for the seat to which Bork had been nominated) with "betraying" the presidents 
who had appointed them to the Court. See, e.g., Aaron Epstein, As High Court Shifts, Will 
Center Hold?, THE RECORD, Oct. 4, 1992, at A22 ("Leaders in the conservative movement 
felt betrayed, especially by what they perceived as a turnaround by Kennedy. They had 
counted Kennedy as being well within the conservative orbit despite the absence of any 
over-arching ideology."); Nancy E. Roman, "Wimp Bloc" Disappoints Right Wing, THE 
WASH. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A I ( quoting Gary Bauer as describing O'Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter as "quickly becoming an embarrassment to the presidents who appointed them"). 
259 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Deference, THE NEW REPUBLIC Nov. 6, 2000, at 
38 ("The Rehnquist Court ... routinely adopts an imperious tone ... even when striking 
down relatively insignificant, symbolic laws, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
.... "); Patti Waldmeir, Rehnquist Term Muddied by Partisan Slur, FIN. TIMES, June 29, 
200 I, at 7 ("The justices even took their imperial approach so far as to dictate the rules of 
professional golf to the PGA, which was overruled when it tried to insist that disabled 
golfers should not be given special help to compete in elite tournaments."). 
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Republican appointees do not share a monolithic conservative judicial philosophy, 
but rather increasingly disagree over what principled fidelity to judicial restraint 
entails. 260 
Indeed, one prominent, self-described "conservative," Michael Stokes-Paulsen, 
has suggested thatunderstanding the Rehnquist Court, at least as of 1993, required 
an appreciation of the variations of judicial restraint.261 In his view, the Republican 
justices differed in tenns of how they prioritized possible ( or legitimate) sources of 
decision, such as text, structure, precedent, and original understanding. In contrast, 
liberal constitutional scholar Kathleen Sullivan has suggested that the Rehnquist 
Court's justices could be understood not only in the tenns with which Paulsen has 
described them, but also their different preferences regarding the formulation of 
legal principles as either "standards" or "rules. "262 The common theme of Paulsen's 
and Sullivan's analyses is to move away from the characterization of the justices as 
"conservative." Though helpful in developing a different perspective on the Court's 
Republican appointees, the schemes developed by both Paulsen and Sullivan are 
incomplete, for neither explains how liberals fit into them - do Democratic 
260 See generally MICHAELI. GERHARDT, ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS 
AND PERSPECTIVES 283-328 (2d ed. 2000) (providing overview of contemporary 
conservative constitutional theory). 
261 Michael Stokes-Paulsen, The Many Faces of "Judicial Restraint", 1993 PUB. INT. L. 
REV. 3 (1993). 
262 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA L. 
REV. 7 43 ( 1998) [hereinafter Sullivan, Rehnquist Court]; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices 
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). Dean Sullivan explains that 
approaches to constitutional interpretation "that use categorical, formal, bright-line tests are 
rule-like .... By contrast, constitutional tests that employ balancing, intermediate scrutiny, 
or functional analysis operate as standards." Sullivan, Rehnquist Court, supra at 751-52. She 
explains further that: 
A preference for constitutional standards over . . . rules will tend to register as 
political moderation because, generally speaking, rules are more effective than 
standards at effecting sharp and lasting changes in constitutional interpretation .. 
. . The use of standards tends to moderate sharp swings between ideological poles; 
standards allow future courts more discretion to distinguish prior cases and decide 
cases in fact-specific fashion, and thus to afford more solace and spin opportunities 
to the losers. 
Id. at 7 53. According to Dean Sullivan's criteria, only two justices appointed by Presidents 
Reagan and Bush - Scalia and Thomas - generally have favored rules, while the other 
three - O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter - have favored standards. Id. at 754. Dean 
Sullivan suggests, however, that the preference "of standards over rules ... leads 
conservative Justices to reach results that, in a period when the Court is moving rightward, 
appear more moderate or liberal than would a rule fashioned from a similar ideological 
starting point." Id. at 756. 
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appointees or liberals prioritize or develop standards or rules differently than their 
Republican counterparts? 
~ 
In spite of their academic appeal, the schemes suggested by Paulsen, Sullivan, 
and others263 have yet to influence the content of political rhetoric_about the Court. 
The trend among commentators remains characterizing the Court in the same terms 
as it traditionally has been analyzed. For example, scholars talk in terms of judicial 
activism and restraint as well as about liberal and conservative ideology.264 
Moreover, in a recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Democratic senators and 
witnesses supported a more exacting Senate inquiry into the ideologies of judicial 
nominees while Republican senators and witnesses resisted it.265 Many witnesses 
persisted in describing nominees as either liberals or conservatives.266 
In the coming years, we can expect characterizing judicial ideology in the 
traditional terms of "conservative," "liberal," "activist," or adherence to ''judicial 
restraint," to be of only limited utility. The first reason is ideological drift. In the 
world of constitutional law, there are few fixtures. Looking back, as well as ahead, 
in 1941, eminent constitutional scholar Edward Corwin noted that"[ c ]onstitutional 
263 See, e.g., CASS R SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT ( 1999). 
264 See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R Hensley, Assessing the Conservatism of 
the Rehnquist Court, 77 JUDICATURE 83 ( 1993); Robert H. Smith, Uncoupling the "Centrist 
Bloc": An Empirical Analysis of the Thesis of a Dominant, Moderate Bloc on the United 
States Supreme Court, 62 TENN. L. REV. 1 ( 1994) (proposing that there is a .. moderate" bloc 
on the Court). 
265 See Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001 Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 107TH CONG. (2001 ). Another interesting facet of the testimony given before the 
committee is that two former White House Counsels - C. Boyden Gray (first Bush 
Administration) and Lloyd N. Cutler (Carter and ClintonAdministrations)-were opposed 
to any extensive Senate inquiry into ideology. Their agreement across party lines perhaps 
reflects their shared preference to protect executive prerogatives in the judicial selection 
process. 
266 The sensitivity to the ideology of judicial nominees was the central focus of the 
hearings. For example, in his opening statement Democratic Senator Charles Schumer 
stated: 
Id. 
The President, of course, can choose to exercise his nomination power however he 
sees fit. But if the President sends countless nominees who are of a particular 
ideological caste, Democrats will likely exercise their constitutionally-given power 
to deny confirmation so that such nominees do not reorient the direction of the 
federal judiciary. But if the President does not grossly inject ideological politics 
into his selection criteria, neither will the Senate. 
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law has always a central interest to •guard."267 If anything has changed over the 
years in constitutional law, it has been the "central interest" that those empowered 
to discharge constitutional functions have been trying to protect. Hence, the same 
themes - abuse of power, judicial usurpation and restraint, and unprincipled 
activism - have been sounded throughout the past century: In Thayer's classic 
plea of 1893 for judicial self-restraint;268 in President Roosevelt's impassioned radio 
"chat" of March 9, 193 7, calling for re-organization of the federal judiciary;269 in 
the unsuccessful crusade in 1957 to curb judicial enforcement of certain provisions 
of the Bill of Rights;270 in Senator Everet Dirksen's repeated attempts to undo by 
constitutional amendment the 1964 "one man, one-vote" ruling on state legislative 
apportionment;271 and underlying the proposed constitutional amendments to outlaw 
busing, overturn Roe, authorize states to outlaw flag-burning, eliminate life tenure 
for federal judges, and make Supreme Court decisions overturning state and federal 
laws subject to a congressional veto.272 Judicial restraint is no more the singular 
province of conservatives than activism is the penchant of only liberals. 
Second, the fragmentation ofliberalism has produced confusion and uncertainty 
about what exactly a contemporary "liberal" judge would favor. Liberalism has 
fractured to such an extent that it is virtually impossible to say that political or 
judicial liberals would agree on a positive ideology any longer. Whereas Bork 
recounts the trepidation of some conservatives openly to embrace originalism after 
his rejection for fear of hurting their chances for prestigious judicial 
appointments,273 it is at least as true that many prominent constitutional scholars 
eschew being called "liberal" and consider it a negative label in constitutional 
politics.274 Moreover, as Paulsen's analysis suggests, we can expect further 
fragmentation of conservatives. Splits likely will arise not only in how 
conservatives prioritize sources of constitutional authority, but also exacerbate 
divisions among libertarians, social conservatives, moral skeptics, and those who 
267 EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY viii (1941). 
268 See supra note 30. 
269 Fireside Chat (Mar. 9, 1937), in VI THEPUBUC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN 
D. ROOSEVELT (1938-50), at 122-33 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950). 
270 See MURPHY, supra note 182, at 154-208. 
271 See Legislative Apportionment: The Latest Proposal Analyzed, Cong. Rec., 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess., app. 1-3 (Oct. 5, 1965) (remarks of Sen. Joseph D. Tydings); James C. 
Millstone, Dirksen Hires Publicity Firm to Promote His Amendment, ST. Louis PosT-
DISPATCH, Feb. 5, 1966. 
272 See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text; see also ROBERT H. BORK, 
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GoMORRAH 117 ( 1996) (advocating a congressional veto over judicial 
review). 
273 BORK, supra note 245, at 347-48. 
274 Cf Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and 
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (1997) (criticizing, inter alia, the 
reluctance of liberal scholars to embrace the implications of their liberal ideologies). 
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favor property rights and natural law. 
The tenns "conservative," "liberal," "judicial restraint," and "activist" engender 
further complications when one considers some of the consequences that 
technological advances pose for the future of the Supreme Court's agenda, 
particularly in cases involving Bill of Rights claims. The Court has not yet grappled 
with the implications of technological advancements across the spectrum of Bill of 
Rights cases.275 At the very least, technological advances pose an increasing range 
of questions to which conservatives and liberals have yet to develop any systematic 
responses. Although some individuals have begun to think through some of these 
issues, 276 they do not represent or speak for any organized perspective or school of 
thought. 
The problem is not just that "conservatives" and "liberals" have yet to develop 
systematic analyses of the constitutional issues triggered by technological advances. 
A further complication is that the political and judicial authorities responsible for 
resolving the questions triggered by technological advances lack the requisite 
expertise for understanding the technology, much less the problems produced by it. 
An even bigger problem arises from the fact that by the time lawmakers or judges 
have addressed the issues raised by the technological advances that have come 
before them, the technology often has moved on. The end result is a peculiar 
circumstance in which the law, either in the form oflegislation or judicial review, 
is well behind where technology is. Nor can the law ever gain ground. It is 
hopelessly forever trying to catch up. 
The extent of this problem is dramatically apparent when one considers the 
range of possible constitutional issues triggered by recent technological advances 
that legislators and judges are trying to master. The extent of the problem creates 
the possibility of what I describe as a virtual Bill of Rights. By this, I do not just 
mean the realm of cyberspace that no doubt challenges state and federal regulators 
and judges, but a broader conception of the many instances in which legal and 
275 One of the first times technological advancements culminated in a controversial line 
of individual rights claims arose in the economic due process cases, including Lochner, 
which resulted in part from the social and economic disparities produced by mass 
industrialization. The next publicly divisive line of individual rights decisions triggered by 
technological developments appears to be Roe and its progeny. To be sure, there were cases 
before Roe, such as Skinner and Griswold, that dealt as well with reproductive technologies; 
however, these cases hardly generated anything close to the ongoing social and political 
division provoked by Roe. 
276 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) 
(pointing out that technological advances present possible First Amendment, intellectual 
property, and Fourth Amendment difficulties for the Court); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener's Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, 
State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 1996 U. CHI. LEGALF. 377 ( 1996) (analyzing three types 
of online recreation, including edited electronic references and parental control). 
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constitutional protections are unavailable to individual citizens while legislators and 
judges are gearing up for action. Even when officials propose solutions for certain 
technological questions, the technology with which they have been dealing - in 
many instances - has already become advanced in ways that the legislative or 
judicial solutions have failed to adequately anticipate. 
The First Amendment, to begin with, is a realm in which such issues flourish. 
Consider the relatively small range of problems involved in the following: 
providing adequate access to and quality of filtering mechanisms on the Internet; 
the failures thus far in government-mandated regulations of indecency or 
pornography on the Internet; the challenges of devising adequate regulations or 
control ofunsolicited commercial advertising spread on the Internet; the difficulties 
of developing special rules with respect to access, advertising, and usage for the 
members of special communities such as public high schools and universities; and 
the fact that the Internet has already made prior restraint doctrine passe, because by 
the time information has been leaked onto the Internet and spread almost 
instantaneously around the world, it no longer makes sense to seek a judicial 
remedy to block its publication. That technology now allows people to vote from 
their home computers raises questions about the conditions that government may 
place on such activity (in those jurisdictions that allow such absentee voting). Nor 
is it settled, much less clear, whether there are any First or S~ond Amendment 
problems with state or federal restrictions of sales of certain items over the Internet, 
including guns, tobacco products, and liquor. 
The Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures 
undoubtedly is triggered by advancements in surveillance technology. Although the 
Supreme Court recently held that the Fourth Amendment governs police use of 
sense-enhancing technologies for searches,277 there are questions about the extent 
to which the Fourth Amendment applies to law enforcement use of hidden 
surveillance cameras to monitor traffic or activity in large public areas - for 
example, in Times Square278 - by speedily matching the images of people being 
monitored against massive data banks. There are also Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
issues triggered by the relative ease of government access to personal information 
on traveling (as reflected, for example, in the EZ Passes employed for traveling 
along some turnpikes), personal habits (as reflected, for example, in sales receipts), 
and health (from blood or hair samples).279 Moreover, a recent controversy arose 
277 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
278 Many other cities are stepping up the use of surveillance cameras as well. See, e.g., 
Dana Canedy, Tampa Scans the Faces in Its Crowds for Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 
2001 at A 1; Dorothy Erlich, Big Brother is Watching- On Trains, Streets, in Schools, SAN. 
FRAN. CHRON., May 2, 2000 at A21. 
279 See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (banning non-voluntary 
drug testing of pregnant women). 
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when the Ninth Circuit-with conservative federal appellate Judge Alex Kozinski 
as its chief spokesperson - fonnally objected to the monitoring of the judges' and 
their staffs' computer usage by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts in the nation's Capitol.280 Judge Kozinski argued, inter alia, that the 
monitoring constituted unwarranted, if not illegal, invasions of the privacy of the 
court's judges and other personnel. The Administrative Office backed its policy of 
monitoring for pornography, streaming videos, and music; and the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the administrative body overseeing federal judicial 
operations, subsequently affirmed the Administrative Office's policy.281 Such 
monitoring is commonplace in workplaces around the nation. 
Fifth Amendment issues abound. Among these are the following: questions 
about when life begins and the limits of governmental authority to experiment on 
human tissue triggered by such technological advances as cloning; medical research 
involving embryonic stem cells; the extent to which government may restrict 
individuals' access to medical expertise (such as on the Internet) to advance their 
health or their own deaths, however they see fit; and the constraints on 
governmental restrictions on organ transplants or governmental access to deceased 
persons' body parts (such as corneas). 
In other contexts in which it appears the law is more settled, it nevertheless is 
possible to press existing doctrine. For example, in Maryland v. Craig,282 the Court 
addressed the legitimacy of a child's testifying by way of closed-circuit television 
against an adult. At some point, the Court can expect claims to arise about the 
legitimacy of video testimony in other contexts, including spousal abuse or 
circumstances in which individuals are unavailable for live testimony. 283 Moreover, 
the Court no doubt will continue to be subjected to increasing pressure to allow 
cameras to cover its proceedings, live radio feeds of its oral arguments (as it 
permitted in Bush v. Gore), and even public televising of executions. 
With respect to virtually all of these issues, there is no clearly set or uniform 
"conservative" or "liberal" attitude. Some "conservatives" undoubtedly will favor 
no regulation or the most minimal public regulation possible in each of the areas 
mentioned; others might construe the Constitution as empowering majorities to 
resolve the regulatory questions posed in each of these areas; and still others will 
280 See Neil A. Lewis, Monitoring of Judiciary Computers Is Backed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
14, 2001, atA4. 
281 See Tony Mauro, Federal Courts Adopt New Online Policies; Judicial Conference 
Approves Monitoring of Court Computers and Internet Access to Civil Court Documents, 
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 200 l, at 6. 
282 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
283 See, e.g., Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 2001) (allowing testimony 
via satellite in a case where witness lived in Argentina and was in poor health); United States 
v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000) (allowing 
testimony via two-way video link in organized crime trial). 
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probably fall somewhere in between these extremes. Liberals are likely to reflect 
equally divergent perspectives, with some perhaps favoring governmental regulation 
to promote the general welfare in most or all of these fields, and others supporting 
judicial review to protect privacy and other individual liberty interests implicated 
in most or all of these areas. Liberals are likely to divide over whether individual 
autonomy requires (1) increased access to as much information as possible, or (2) 
greater protection from the loss of privacy entailed in accessing such information 
or that is otherwise made' possible as a result of advancements in information 
technology. 284 In short, neither "liberals" nor "conservatives" will necessarily have 
predictable attitudes about how the Constitution applies ( or does not apply) in these 
cases. 
Moreover, technological advances have changed governmental operations-
both the Bork and Thomas confirmation hearings, for instance, were influenced 
heavily by technological developments. In Bork's case, technological advancements 
made possible the mass political organization and mass coverage of his hearings, 
whereas in Thomas' s case, the mediazation of the hearings helped to dramatize the 
charges against him and his responses. By 2001, the twenty-four-hour news cycle 
and the Internet have created increasing incentives for the media to devote much 
more of their programs or space to speculation and commentary ("soft news") than 
to reporting actual data and events ("hard news"). These "advancements" do not 
necessarily make it easier for people to become informed, but rather cause the 
public to depend on others as conduits for the information about public events they 
think they need. Thus, technological advancements help to shape the very 
environment in which we learn about them and their possible repercussions for 
284 See J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 
1987-88 (1992): 
Id. 
Do traditional liberal notions of autonomy continue to make sense in an age 
where control of infonnation processing increasingly means new forms of 
control over individuals themselves? Or has the liberal ideal of the free market 
of ideas now turned in on itself and created a new form of totalitarianism, a 
prison constructed from access to information rather than from steel bars? .. : 
These issues strike at the heart ofliberal political philosophy. Privacy is deeply 
related to notions of individualism and individual autonomy .... What will 
happen to the fabric of intimate relations in a world in which technological 
advancement increasingly shrinks the domain of the private self? Will 
traditional assumptions about personal privacy ( and hence autonomy} still make 
sense, or will they have to be reimagined in wholly different ways? And, if this 
is so, what will happen to a constitutional jurisprudence based on eighteenth-
century notions of privacy and autonomy that assumed a world without our 
present technological advancements? 
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constitutional law. 
Last but not least, technological advancements pose a fundamental problem for 
the definition and operations of federalism. The physical geography outside of 
cyberspace does not correspond to its internal architecture. If there is any 
correspondence, it depends less on the preferences of state or federal authorities 
than on the plans of web designers who currently answer to no one except perhaps 
their customers or corporate sponsors. Hence, in cyberspace, the dividing line 
between federal and state boundaries is illusory - it is not possible to detect 
precisely where the scope of federal authority (such as its Commerce Clause power) 
ends and state sovereignty begins.285 The concept of a community is dictated 
largely, if not wholly, by the architecture of cyberspace - while it is true, for 
instance, that America Online is a national operation, interaction among those who 
use its services could be extremely localized (such as two users in the same 
household) or purely artificial ( such as in a chat room). A university or high school 
can structure opportunities for interaction or instruction that, depending on the 
services, are open to the world at large or only to its employees and students. In all 
of these contexts, neither liberals nor conservatives have devised any consensus on 
the criteria for defining the relevant community for constitutional or legislative 
purposes. 
Even though the Rehnquist Court has ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects only negative liberties and thus does not impose any affirmative obligations 
on the state, 286 many people worry about the dangers that state inaction with respect 
to technological advancements poses for citizens.287 These potential privacy 
problems are myriad, including identity theft on the Internet; dissemination of 
private medical information;288 the use of "cookies" to track individual Internet 
use;289 the spread of embarrassing rumors or tips across the Internet; the release of 
videos onto the Internet (such as the women or docto~ who frequent Planned 
Parenthood or abortion facilities); and the burdensome requirement of opting-out 
285 Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
286 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
287 See Edmund Sanders, Privacy Cases Not Yielding Much Payoff, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 
200 I, § 3 (Business), at I ( asserting that "plaintiffs' attorneys are resorting to creative legal 
arguments" and quoting a Washington privacy advocate as stating '"You have to stitch and 
quilt existing laws to make it work .... It's not clean and it's not easy."'). 
288 This was the subject of a recent case in the New York state courts, Anonymous v. CVS 
Corp., 728 N.Y.S. 2d 333 (N.Y. 2001), in which an individual with HIV/AIDS sued CVS 
after the nation-wide chain bought his/her local drug store and then made his/her 
prescription information available to every CVS store in the nation. 
289 See In re Intuit Privacy Litigation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (denying 
motion by defendant to dismiss privacy claims). CJ In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy 
Litigation, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3498 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001) (granting DoubleClick 
summary judgment and dismissing all claims with prejudice). 
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of plans by businesses to sell their personal information. 290 This list is by no means 
exhaustive; it expands everyday as technology advances along with the 
corresponding social and legal challenges its growth engenders. Consequently, as 
federal and state governments coordinate or tussle over regulatory solutions to these 
problems, our conceptions of federalism - and the limits of the Bill of Rights -
will be stretched in ways yet to be conceived. 
CONCLUSION 
There is more to the history of the Bill of Rights over the past one hundred 
years than the path of its interpretation by the Supreme Court. The history of the 
Bill of Rights over the last century reflects the constancy of popular rhetoric about 
the Supreme Court, regardless of shifting interpretations of the Bill of Rights. 
Although the Bill of Rights has moved increasingly into the center of the Supreme 
Court's agenda, its movement has not corresponded with a change in the terms 
deployed in popular discourse about the Supreme Court. The terms remain the 
same, while their referents have changed. Neither judicial activism nor restraint has 
ever been a fixed "liberal" or "conservative" notion, but rather, depend on the 
political authorities who control ''the central interests" at stake in constitutional 
adjudication at a given moment in our history. The rhetoric parallels shifts in this 
control. 
The constancy of our rhetoric comes, however, at a price, because the 
persistence of our rhetoric has limited utility. The constitutional issue that is likely 
to dominate the Court's agenda over the course of the next century - the proper 
relationship between the State and technology - is likely to challenge our 
terminology in increasingly inconceivable ways. Liberals already have fragmented 
in their attitudes toward
0 
the expansive interpretations of the Bill of Rights by the 
Warren and Burger Courts, but they are sure to divide further when confronted with 
the consequences that technological advancements pose for personal autonomy or 
freedom over the next century. Liberals are not sure whether maximizing individual 
autonomy requires more or less regulation. Similarly, conservatives have no 
predictable or organized response to these advancements, which complicate 
traditional notions of free speech, privacy, federalism, property rights, and limited 
federal power. 
As technology advances, the pressures to maintain traditional notions such as 
judicial restraint and activism are bound to intensify. These notions persist because 
they are culturally and socially ingrained, generally familiar, and trigger politically 
salient imagery. Yet they are unlikely to capture the complexity of the 
290 See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Getting a Handle on Privacy's Fine Print; Financial 
Firms' Policy Notices Aren't Always 'Clear and Conspicuous' as Law Requires, WASH. 
P0ST,June 17,2001,atHl. 
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consequences posed by technological advancements. The less effectively our 
rhetoric captures this complexity, the wider the gap between practical and 
constitutional reality. The bridging of this gap is the first great test that our fidelity 
to the Bill of Rights will have in the twenty-first century: The more our technology 
pulls us into the future, the greater the necessity of resisting the pull of our rhetoric 
of judicial critique to imprison us in the past. 
